Georgia Law Review
Volume 57

Number 1

Article 4

11-18-2022

Because They Are Lawyers First and Foremost: Ethics Rules and
Other Strategies to Protect the Justice Department from a
Faithless President
Stephen Gillers

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Gillers, Stephen (2022) "Because They Are Lawyers First and Foremost: Ethics Rules and Other Strategies
to Protect the Justice Department from a Faithless President," Georgia Law Review: Vol. 57: No. 1, Article
4.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol57/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Georgia Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University
of Georgia School of Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access For more information, please
contact tstriepe@uga.edu.

Because They Are Lawyers First and Foremost: Ethics Rules and Other Strategies
to Protect the Justice Department from a Faithless President
Cover Page Footnote
Elihu Root Professor of Law (Emeritus), New York University School of Law. I would like to thank
Professor Barbara S. Gillers for her meticulous readings of earlier drafts of this Article and especially for
her focus not only on the words and sentences but also the overall arguments. I also thank the
D’Agostino/Greenberg Fund for support that allowed time for research and writing.

This article is available in Georgia Law Review: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol57/iss1/4

Gillers: Because They Are Lawyers First

BECAUSE THEY ARE LAWYERS FIRST AND
FOREMOST: ETHICS RULES AND OTHER
STRATEGIES TO PROTECT THE JUSTICE
DEPARTMENT FROM A FAITHLESS
PRESIDENT
Stephen Gillers*
During the Trump presidency, Americans were reminded
that the nation relies on norms or custom—not laws alone—to
protect the Department of Justice and the rule of law from
improper political interference. The Justice Department is an
agency within the Executive Branch and the Supreme Court
has told us that the executive power—“all of it”—resides in the
President alone, implying that the President can use the
Department anyway he wishes limited only by the Constitution
and by laws that do not violate separation of powers principles.
Which laws are those? This Article concludes that Congress can
do only a little to constrain executive power but enough to
prevent some of the worst abuses.
Another check on the President’s executive power is the third
branch of government—the judiciary. A proper exercise of
judicial power will not violate separation of powers principles
even if it prevents the President from acting as he may wish.
This is obvious, of course, for decisions in cases within a court’s
jurisdiction, but courts do more than decide cases. As relevant
here, they also write professional conduct (or ethics) rules for
lawyers whom they license or who appear before them.
Authority to do so is an exercise of their inherent power. Those
rules govern all lawyers including lawyers at the Department
of Justice. And the rules are not limited to the conduct of
lawyers who go to court. They apply whenever a lawyer
represents a client. Justice Department lawyers must refuse to
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to thank Professor Barbara S. Gillers for her meticulous readings of earlier drafts of this
Article and especially for her focus not only on the words and sentences but also the overall
arguments. I also thank the D’Agostino/Greenberg Fund for support that allowed time for
research and writing.
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follow a President’s instructions that do not faithfully execute
the laws or if doing so would otherwise violate a court rule.
In a clash between the executive and the judiciary—where a
federal or state court rule imposes a duty that may interfere
with a goal the President wishes to accomplish—who wins?
This Article argues that the judiciary wins. Its victory is further
assured because the court’s authority to require obedience to its
ethics rules does not rely on inherent judicial power alone,
although that would suffice. The judicial authority has also
been endorsed in congressional legislation. This Article
analyzes certain provisions in the Model Rules of the American
Bar Association and the professional conduct rules of the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals (which govern many
Justice Department lawyers, including the Attorney General
and inferior officers who work in the District) and explains how
each rule may be a check on executive power.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“[W]hen the President does it, that means that it is not illegal.”1
“I have absolute right to do what I want to do with the Justice
Department.”2
Imagine that,3 after the President appeared to have lost his
reelection bid but before the electoral votes were counted in
Congress, as the law requires, he instructed the Justice Department
to file declaratory and injunctive actions against four states where
he lost, but where the popular vote was close. If those states’
electoral votes were switched to the President or not counted, or
even if their results were put in doubt while the actions proceeded,
the Vice President, who presides at the electoral vote count, would
be able to declare the President to have won the election. At the
President’s request, an election law lawyer gave the President a
legal memorandum that supported the President’s position. The
President gave the memorandum to the Attorney General, who
disagreed with it. The President instructed the Attorney General to
Brian Stelter, David Frost, Interviewer Who Got Nixon to Apologize for Watergate, Dies at
74, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/world/europe/davidfrost-known-for-nixon-interview-dead-at-74.html (quoting Richard Nixon).
2 Michael S. Schmidt & Michael D. Shear, Trump Says Russia Inquiry Makes U.S. “Look
Very
Bad,”
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
28,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/28/us/politics/trump-interview-mueller-russia-chinanorth-korea.html (quoting Donald Trump).
3 This hypothetical draws on Michael S. Schmidt & Maggie Haberman, The Lawyer Behind
the Memo on How Trump Could Stay in Office, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/02/us/politics/john-eastman-trump-memo.html
(explaining a memo provided to President Donald Trump outlining a path to retaining the
presidency); see also STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 117TH CONG., SUBVERTING
JUSTICE: HOW THE FORMER PRESIDENT AND HIS ALLIES PRESSURED DOJ TO OVERTURN THE
2020
ELECTION
(2021)
[hereinafter
SUBVERTING
JUSTICE],
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/subverting-justice-how-the-former-president-and-hisallies-pressured-doj-to-overturn-the-2020-election (explaining steps taken by Trump based
on a memo outlining possible avenues to retain power and containing testimony before the
January 6 select committee of the House of Representatives); Warren Rojas, The Latest
Transcripts from the January 6 Select Committee's Public Hearings, BUS. INSIDER (Jul. 12,
2022, 6:01 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/january-6-committee-hearing-transcriptsliz-cheney-bennie-thompson-2022-6 (providing full transcripts of all January 6 select
committee hearings and testimony). Quotations are invented.
1
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file the actions and rely on the memorandum’s analysis and
whatever additional research supported the President’s position.
When the Attorney General refused, the President reminded him
that the Department of Justice was part of the Executive Branch of
government and worked for him. The President quoted a provision
of the United States Code, which the election lawyer had given him:
“The Department of Justice is an executive department of the
United States at the seat of Government.”4 The President then
quoted Chief Justice John Roberts’s 2020 opinion in Seila Law LLC
v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau5: “Under our
Constitution, the ‘executive Power’—all of it—is ‘vested in a
President,’”6 “All of it,” the President emphasized. “You work for me,
and I can fire you.”
“You can fire me,” the Attorney General replied, “but the lawyers
here don’t work for you. We work for the United States by helping
you faithfully execute the laws. We can’t do what you ask because it
is not the faithful execution of the laws, and because we are lawyers
first and foremost.”
***
An interpretation of the Constitution that purports to give the
President total or near total power over the work of the Executive
Branch including the Department of Justice was not inevitable. It
rests on a perceived relationship between two clauses in Article II
of the Constitution, which creates the presidency. Nearly a century
ago, in Myers v. United States, the Supreme Court rejected a
congressional effort to give an Executive Branch officer protection
against removal, citing the Appointments and the Take Care
Clauses of Article II.7 Now, the current Court has doubled down.
“Under our Constitution, the ‘executive Power’—all of it—is ‘vested
in a President,’ who must ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed,’”8 Chief Justice Roberts wrote in explaining why the

28 U.S.C. § 501.
140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020).
6 Id. at 2191 (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1).
7 See 272 U.S. 52, 117–18 (1926) (finding the lack of explicit limits on removal in the
Appointments and Take Care Clauses to be a “convincing indication that none was intended”).
The Court also cited the Vesting Clause. Id. at 108.
8 Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2191 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; id. § 3).
4
5
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President could remove the Director of the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (CFPB) before his term expired and without the
showing of “cause” that the legislation creating the position
required.9 Under the Appointments Clause10 and the Vesting
Clause,11 it must be thus, Roberts told us, so that the President
could fulfill his constitutional duty under the Take Care Clause.12
The President is elected; executive department officers and
employees are not.13 There are, Roberts seemed to imply, no checks
and balances within the Executive Branch, a perspective that has
received academic attention and concern.14 So viewed, the President
holds all the cards within the Executive Branch.15 Or, as President
George W. Bush put it, anticipating Roberts by fourteen years, one

9 See id. at 2192 (holding that the structure of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
violated the Constitution, thus allowing the President to remove the Director at will).
10 Article II, Section 2 provides that the President “shall nominate, and by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Officers of the United States, whose
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law:
but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think
proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.” U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
11 Article II, Section 1, provides: “The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America.” Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
12 See Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2191 (“Article II provides that ‘[t]he executive Power shall
be vested in a President,’ who must ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’ The
entire ‘executive Power’ belongs to the President alone.” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl.
1; id. § 3)). The Take Care Clause requires that the President “shall take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
13 See Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2203 (noting that only the President and Vice President are
elected by the entire nation while highlighting that the Director of the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau is not). A year later, the Court was explicit in tying the removal power to
the postulate of democratic government. See infra notes 117–124 and accompanying text.
14 See, e.g., Neal K. Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most
Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2318 (2006) (recognizing the scope of
executive power and proposing “a set of mechanisms that create checks and balances within
the Executive Branch”).
15 See Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2203 (“[I]ndividual executive officials will still wield
significant authority, but that authority remains subject to the ongoing supervision and
control of the elected President.”).
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person had to be the “decider” and that person was he.16 The “buck”
stopped at the Oval.17
Roberts was unequivocal. He cited Myers, among other decisions,
that did not speak quite so absolutely (“all of it”) and could be read
less so. In fact, cases Roberts cited have impressive dissenters,
including Justices Brandeis and Holmes in Myers itself, each of
whom differently interpreted the combined effect of the
Appointments Clause, the Take Care Clause, and Article II’s
vesting of “executive Power” in the President.18
But it is what it is. I accept these decisions and the reading of the
Appointments and Take Care Clauses as applied to the facts of the
cases construing them. But I argue that “all of it,” despite its
rhetorical flourish, is not now and never was a correct description
of the President’s power over the Executive Branch. Nor was so
absolute a description necessary or even helpful to answer the
narrow questions that have come to the Court.19 To be sure, the
President’s power is broad, but there is power in Congress to contain
it. Article II itself envisions two roles for Congress in staffing the
government. The President has the power to appoint “all other
Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law,”
which means by Congress.20 And Congress can choose to “vest” the

Explaining why he would not fire Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Bush said, “I hear
the voices and I read the front page and I hear the speculation. But I'm the decider, and I
decide what's best. And what's best is for Don Rumsfeld to remain as the secretary of defense.”
Sheryl
G.
Stolberg,
The
Decider,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
24,
2006),
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/24/weekinreview/the-decider.html.
17 On President Harry S. Truman’s desk was a nameplate reading “The Buck Stops Here.”
The
Buck
Stops
Here,
HARRY
S.
TRUMAN
LIBRARY
&
MUSEUM,
https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/photograph-records/64-1563 (last visited Sept. 14, 2020).
18 See 272 U.S. 52, 264 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The assertion that the mere grant
by the Constitution of executive power confers upon the President as a prerogative the
unrestricted power of appointment and of removal from executive offices . . . is clearly
inconsistent also with those statutes which restrict the exercise by the President of the power
of nomination.”); id. at 177 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The duty of the President to see that the
laws be executed is a duty that does not go beyond the laws or require him to achieve more
than Congress sees fit to leave within his power.”).
19 Seila Law itself addressed only the constitutionality of job protection for the director of
the Consumer Protection Financial Bureau. 140 S. Ct. at 2192; see also infra notes 69, 115–
117 and accompanying text.
20 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
16
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appointment of “inferior Officers” in the “Courts of Law” and “Heads
of Departments” instead of the President.21
So “all” is either wrong or at best an exaggeration. And “all of it”
tells us nothing about the “it.” “Executive power,” of course, but
what is that? For example, if Congress, acting under its Article II
power, were to create an Executive Department of the Weather to
enforce the Weather Laws, which Congress then enacts, could
Congress specify the educational and experiential requirements of
the principal and inferior officers, thereby limiting whom the
President could appoint? Or are qualifications of those officers part
of the “it”—the “Executive Power”—that the President has “all of?”22
Focusing specifically on the Department of Justice, I ask: Can we
protect against improper political interference with the work of the
Department of Justice without restricting the President’s Article II
powers as Supreme Court cases have broadly defined them? By
“improper political interference,” I mean a presidential (or
Executive Branch) instruction to take or refrain from action that
violates the President’s duty to “faithfully” execute the laws, as the
lawyers receiving the instruction know or should know, and which
will in turn require them to disobey the instruction or at least

21
22

Id.
See infra Part IV.
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further investigate.23 Or are Nixon and Trump correct?24 Should we
read Roberts’s Seila Law opinion to agree with them?
During the Trump presidency, we learned that the norms that
long defined the border between politics and the administration of
justice were merely assumptions, merely tradition, not mandatory
and not law.25 And so it is important now to ask whether and how
we can fortify those norms while also respecting the President’s vast
power over the Executive Branch.
This Article will offer several ways to prevent improper political
(i.e., faithless) interference with the Department of Justice’s work.
None is foreclosed by the Court’s holdings, beginning with Myers.
The first strategy is through legislation that sets the qualifications
for nominees for officer positions in the Department of Justice and
describes the commitments they should be required to make as a
condition of confirmation.26 Although the Attorney General must be
appointed by the President, Congress, as a second strategy, can give
the Attorney General the power to appoint (and remove) the
For the duty to “faithfully” execute the laws, see infra text accompanying note 271 (citing
the constitutionally required presidential oath of office which contains the “faithful[]”
execution of duties directive). Other federal employees also take an oath to “faithfully
discharge the duties” of their office. See 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (requiring government employees
who are “elected or appointed to an office of honor or profit in the civil service or uniformed
services” to take an oath to “faithfully discharge the duties” of that office). An example of
improper political interference may be the conduct of Mark Meadows, Trump’s Chief of Staff,
during events leading up to the January 6, 2021, invasion of the Capitol: “[A]ccording to
documents provided by the Department of Justice, while you [Meadows] were the President’s
Chief of Staff, you directly communicated with the highest officials at the Department of
Justice requesting investigations into election fraud matters in several states.” Letter from
Rep. Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman of the Select Comm. to Investigate the January 6th
Attack on the United States Capitol, 117th Cong. (Sept. 23, 2021).
Another example of improper political interference may be the conduct of acting Assistant
Attorney General Jeffrey Clark, who reportedly met with Trump without the knowledge and
against the orders of the acting Attorney General “as part of a plot . . . to wield the
department’s power to try to alter the Georgia election outcome.” Katie Benner & Charlie
Savage, Jeffrey Clark Was Considered Unassuming. Then He Plotted with Trump, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan.
24,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/24/us/politics/jeffrey-clark-trumpelection.html.
24 See supra notes 1–2.
25 David Montgomery, The Abnormal Presidency, WASH. POST (Nov. 10, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/lifestyle/magazine/trump-presidentialnorm-breaking-list, (listing “the 20 most important norms that Trump has ignored or
undermined,” including refusing oversight by Inspectors General and “interfering in
department of justice investigations”).
26 See infra text accompanying notes 127–160.
23

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol57/iss1/4

10

Gillers: Because They Are Lawyers First

2022]

BECAUSE THEY ARE LAWYERS FIRST

173

Department’s inferior officers, especially where the risk of improper
political interference is greatest.27 Third, Congress can pass
legislation to prevent the Department from refusing congressional
demands for information, or certain categories of information, by
citing attorney-client privilege.28
A fourth strategy looks to rules of professional conduct for
lawyers (“ethics rules”).29 State and federal courts adopt
professional conduct rules to govern the lawyers they license or who
appear before them.30 Justice Department lawyers, like all lawyers,
have a second master in addition to their client—the courts. The
President, I argue, cannot order them to violate the ethics rules of
their licensing jurisdiction or where they “engage[] in [their]
duties,”31 even if those rules interfere with how the President may
wish to execute the law. In every American jurisdiction, for
example, rules forbid lawyers to lie to a judge or suborn perjury. If
they later discover that their own or a witness’s statement was false,
they may need to correct it (even if the statement though false was
not a lie).32 The President cannot instruct a government lawyer to

See infra text accompanying notes 161–166.
See infra text accompanying notes 249–254
29 See infra Part VII. I will use the term “ethics rules” for convenience, recognizing that the
rules are not about ethics in the conventional sense. In this Article, the word “Rule” followed
by a number refers to both the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the
Washington, D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct where they are the same or substantially the
same. References to the “ABA rules” mean the Model Rules. Where the Washington, D.C.
rules substantially differ, the citation will specifically identify the “Washington, D.C. Rule.”
30 See Katherine M. Lasher, Comment, A Call for a Uniform Standard of Professional
Responsibility in the Federal Court System: Is Regulation of Recalcitrant Attorneys at the
District Court Level Effective?, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 901, 901 (1998) (outlining how the “ABA
models serve only as guidelines to state rules governing professional conduct” and that the
states each have separate rules relating to professional conduct, which federal courts may
adopt or fashion after the ABA Model Rules); MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(a)–(b)
(AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (describing the disciplinary authority of a court and the rule that the
court will apply, which may not be its own); D.C. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(a)–(b) (D.C.
BAR 2022) (describing the same).
31 See infra text accompanying notes 167–179.
32 See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.3(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (establishing that “[a]
lawyer shall not knowingly . . . make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to
correct a false statement of material fact or law” and “shall take reasonable remedial
measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal” in the event that the lawyer, the
lawyer’s client, or a witness called by the lawyer offers evidence the lawyer later comes to
know was false).
27
28
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violate these and other professional conduct rules, just as he cannot
instruct a lawyer to bribe a juror.33
Perhaps Congress could override some state court ethics rules as
they apply to federal lawyers, but it has not. In fact, it has done the
opposite. It has endorsed them through legislation.34 Perhaps a
particularly aggressive congressional effort to restrict how federal
lawyers represent the United States would succumb to the
President’s take care authority, but so far Congress has merely
required that federal lawyers comply with the same federal and
state court rules that bind all lawyers in the jurisdiction where they
are licensed or work.35 And perhaps a state court’s ethics rule would
be invalid if it were found to substantially interfere with the
President’s take care authority. That has also not happened.
Part II looks at the ways the fifty states and the District of
Columbia have chosen to protect their Attorneys General from
improper political interference. The near unanimity of their choices
should influence, even though it does not control, consideration of
proposals to protect federal lawyers from improper political
interference, including the proposals in this Article. Part III
addresses the Court’s interpretation of the Appointments and Take
Care Clauses, including with regard to the work and staff of the
Department of Justice. It describes what Congress cannot do
because it would interfere with the President’s take care duty and,
conversely, what Congress is able, or may be able, to do to prevent
improper political interference with the Department, without
encroaching on that duty. Part IV proposes adopting statutory
qualifications and conditions for appointment of the Attorney
General and the Department of Justice’s inferior officers. The single
most important safeguard against the success of improper political
interference may be the character of the people appointed to lead
the Department.36 Part V identifies the source of authority for
applying the professional conduct rules of state and federal courts
to the work of federal lawyers. Part VI then looks at what those
33 See id. r. 3.5(a) (“A lawyer shall not . . . seek to influence a judge, juror, or prospective
juror or other official by means prohibited by law.”).
34 28 U.S.C. § 530B(a) provides that: “An attorney for the Government shall be subject to
State laws and rules, and local Federal court rules, governing attorneys in each State where
such attorney engages in that attorney’s duties, to the same extent and in the same manner
as other attorneys in that State.” See also infra text accompanying note 142.
35 See 28 U.S.C. § 530B(a) (subjecting government attorneys to local laws and rules).
36 See infra notes 127–131 and accompanying text.
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rules have to say about government lawyers in particular. Part VII
explains how state and federal court ethics rules that govern the
Department’s lawyers can help protect against improper political
interference with their work. These rules can be amended to
reinforce that protection. The ability of current and proposed
professional conduct rules to prevent improper political interference
with the work of the Justice Department has received some
academic attention37 but deserves much more.

II. LESSONS FROM THE STATES
The federal government is an outlier among United States
jurisdictions in how it protects the rule of law from improper
political interference. Only two states give their Governors as much
power over their Attorneys General as the President has over the
Attorney General of the United States.
In forty-three states and Washington, D.C., voters elect the
Attorney General.38 Tennessee’s Supreme Court picks its Attorney
General,39 and in Maine, the legislature does.40 That leaves five
states—Alaska, Connecticut, Hawaii, New Jersey, and Wyoming—
where the Governor appoints the Attorney General.41 But three of
these states do not allow the Governor to fire the Attorney General
at will. Instead, they provide various protections that enable the
37 See, e.g., Bruce Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Can the President Control the Department of
Justice, 70 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2018) (arguing that professional norms insulate the Department
of Justice from the rest of the Executive Branch); Andrew McCanse Wright, The Take Care
Clause, Justice Department Independence, and White House Control, 121 W. VA. L. REV. 353,
358 (2018) (arguing that the President’s bad faith interference in the Department of Justice
would violate the Take Care Clause); W. Bradley Wendel, Government Lawyers in the Trump
Administration, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 275, 284 (2017) (proposing “a constructive ethical vision of
the responsibilities of government lawyers as having fiduciary duties including loyal client
service, creative problem-solving, competence and independence in advising, and respect for
the rule of law”).
38 See William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General,
and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2448 n.3 (2006) (“The Attorney
General is independently elected in forty-three states.”); Note, Appointing State Attorneys
General: Evaluating the Unbundled State Executive, 127 HARV. L. REV. 973, 982 (2014)
(same); Zukerberg v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 97 A.3d 1064, 1065 (D.C. 2014) (“In 2010,
the District of Columbia Charter was amended to allow District residents to elect their
Attorney General.”).
39 Marshall, supra note 38, at 2448 n.3.
40 Id.
41 Id.
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Attorney General to act independently. In Hawaii, the Attorney
General cannot be removed without the State Senate’s consent.42 In
New Hampshire, removal requires the Governor to provide a
statement of cause.43 The New Hampshire Attorney General is
entitled to be heard “in his defense by a joint committee of both
houses of the legislature.”44 In New Jersey, the Attorney General
must be given notice of the charges and “an opportunity to be heard
at a public hearing,” with “the right of judicial review, on both the
law and the facts.”45
The lesson here is that Washington, D.C. and all states but two
give their Attorney General job protection, either outright, by
taking the Governor out of the selection process, or in other ways.
Only Wyoming and Alaska adopt the federal model.
I do not cite arrangements at the state and local levels to argue
that the Constitution should be amended to allow for the popular
election of the United States Attorney General or as a reason to
restrict the President’s power to fire an Attorney General. While
those are interesting ideas, neither is about to happen. Given events
during the Trump presidency, my interest is in more immediately
achievable ways to prevent improper political interference with the
Department of Justice. But the near unanimity of state choices
should have some bearing on whether congressional efforts to
protect Department lawyers against improper political interference
is consistent with the nation’s values and the President’s authority
under the Take Care Clause.

42 See HAW. CONST. art V, § 6, cl. 2 (“[T]he removal of the chief legal officer of the State
shall be subject to the advice and consent of the senate.”).
43 See N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 73 (“The governor with the consent of the council may remove
any commissioned officer for reasonable cause.”); see also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4:1 (“The
attorney general, the governor, any member of the executive council, or the appointing
authority of such official, may petition the governor and council for the removal of such official
setting forth the grounds and reasons therefor.”).
44 N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 73.
45 N.J. CONST. art. V, § 4, ¶ 5. Local prosecutors are elected in the great majority of
jurisdictions. Carissa Byrne Hessick & Michael Morse, Picking Prosecutors, 105 IOWA L. REV.
1537, 1550 (2020) (“Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, and New Jersey appoint their local
prosecutors. New Jersey is the only state whose appointment process resembles the federal
model: County prosecutors are appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the
state senate. In Alaska and Delaware, the attorneys general appoint local prosecutors.
Connecticut creates a commission to select and appoint a State's Attorney for each district.”
(footnotes omitted)).
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III. THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE, THE TAKE CARE CLAUSE, AND
THE EXECUTIVE POWER
In the Supreme Court’s nomenclature for the Constitution’s
semi-opaque Appointments Clause, Executive Branch officers are
either principal or inferior officers. One Article II clause uses the
term “inferior Officers”46 and another clause in Article II refers to
the “principal Officer in each of the executive Departments.”47 The
Supreme Court has chosen to use “principal” to designate those
officers of the United States who must be appointed by the
President.48 By contrast:
Generally speaking, the term “inferior officer” connotes
a relationship with some higher ranking officer or
officers below the President: Whether one is an
“inferior” officer depends on whether he has a
superior. . . . [W]e think it evident that “inferior
officers” are officers whose work is directed and
supervised at some level by others who were appointed
by Presidential nomination with the advice and consent
of the Senate.49

See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[T]he Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of
such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or
in the Heads of Departments.”).
47 See id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“[The President] may require the Opinion, in writing, of the
principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the
Duties of their respective Offices.”).
48 See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 659 (1997) (“By vesting the President with
the exclusive power to select the principal (noninferior) officers of the United States, the
Appointments Clause prevents congressional encroachment upon the Executive and Judicial
Branches.”).
49 Id. at 662–63.
46
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Everyone who is not a principal or inferior officer is an
employee.50 The difference turns on the manner of appointment, not
the nature of the work.51
In Myers,52 a first-class postmaster, an “inferior officer”53 whom
the President had appointed with the consent of the Senate,
challenged the President’s power to remove him before expiration of
his term without the Senate’s consent, which the governing statute
required.54 Construing the Appointments Clause, the Take Care
Clause, and the Constitution’s vesting of the “Executive Power” in
the President, the Court held that the President had constitutional
removal authority that a statute could not limit.55 Because the
President had the appointment authority under the statute creating
the position, he also had the removal authority.56 Congress could,
however, deny the President the power to remove inferior officers
by giving the appointment power to the head of the Department or
the courts, as Article II permits.57 The Court wrote:
[B]y the specific constitutional provision for
appointment of executive officers with its necessary
incident of removal, the power of appointment and
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 n.162 (1976) (“‘Officers of the United States’ does
not include all employees of the United States, but there is no claim made that the
Commissioners are employees of the United States, rather than officers. Employees are lesser
functionaries subordinate to officers of the United States . . . .” (first citing Auffmordt v.
Hedden, 137 U. S. 310, 327 (1890); and then citing United States v. Germaine, 99 U. S. 508,
512 (1879))).
51 See Burnap v. United States, 252 U.S. 512, 516 (1920) (“The distinction between officer
and employee in this connection does not rest upon differences in the qualifications necessary
to fill the positions or in the character of the service to be performed. Whether the incumbent
is an officer or an employee is determined by the manner in which Congress has specifically
provided for the creation of the several positions, their duties and appointment thereto.”).
52 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
53 Id. at 158.
54 See id. at 107 (“By the sixth section of the Act of Congress . . . under which Myers was
appointed . . . ‘[p]ostmasters . . . may be removed by the President by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate . . . .’”).
55 See id. at 176 (holding that the provision of the Tenure of Office Act of 1867 denying the
President unrestricted removal power of first-class postmasters is constitutionally invalid).
56 See id. at 126 (“In the absence of any specific provision to the contrary, the power of
appointment to executive office carries with it, as a necessary incident, the power of
removal.”).
57 See id. at 127 (noting that Congress is empowered “to limit and regulate” removal of
inferior officers when it exercises constitutional appointment powers).
50
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removal is clearly provided for by the Constitution, and
the legislative power of Congress in respect to both is
excluded save by the specific exception as to inferior
offices in the clause that follows. This is “but the
Congress may by law vest the appointment of such
inferior officers, as they think proper, in the President
alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
Departments.” These words, it has been held by this
Court, give to Congress the power to limit and regulate
removal of such inferior officers by heads of
departments when it exercises its constitutional power
to lodge the power of appointment with them. [At this
point in the text of the opinion, the Court cited United
States v. Perkins, 116 U. S. 483 (1886).] Here then is an
express provision, introduced in words of exception for
the exercise by Congress of legislative power in the
matter of appointments and removals in the case of
inferior executive officers.58

58 Id. at 126–27 (first quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; and then citing United States
v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483, 485 (1886)). The Court in Myers later reiterated that Congress could
limit the President’s removal power for inferior officers by giving others the power to appoint
them:
Our conclusion on the merits . . . is that Article II grants to the President
the executive power of the Government, i.e., the general administrative
control of those executing the laws, including the power of appointment and
removal of executive officers—a conclusion confirmed by his obligation to
take care that the laws be faithfully executed; that Article II excludes the
exercise of legislative power by Congress to provide for appointments and
removals, except only as granted therein to Congress in the matter of inferior
offices; that Congress is only given power to provide for appointments and
removals of inferior officers after it has vested, and on condition that it does
vest, their appointment in other authority than the President with the
Senate’s consent; that the provisions of the second section of Article II, which
blend action by the legislative branch, or by part of it, in the work of the
executive, are limitations to be strictly construed and not to be extended by
implication; that the President’s power of removal is further established as
an incident to his specifically enumerated function of appointment by and
with the advice of the Senate, but that such incident does not by implication
extend to removals the Senate’s power of checking appointments; and finally
that to hold otherwise would make it impossible for the President, in case of
political or other differences with the Senate or Congress, to take care that
the laws be faithfully executed.
272 U.S. at 163–64.
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In United States v. Perkins, the Secretary of the Navy sought to
discharge an officer whom the Secretary had appointed under a
statute that gave the officer job security.59 The Court of Claims
ruled for the officer:
We have no doubt that when Congress, by law, vests
the appointment of inferior officers in the heads of
Departments it may limit and restrict the power of
removal as it deems best for the public interest. The
constitutional authority in Congress to thus vest the
appointment implies authority to limit, restrict, and
regulate the removal by such laws as Congress may
enact in relation to the officers so appointed.60
The Supreme Court unanimously “adopt[ed] these views, and
affirm[ed] the judgment of the Court of Claims.”61 In its discussion
of Perkins, the Myers Court again recognized the power of Congress,
when it lodges the appointment power of inferior officers in “Heads
of Departments,” to impose limits on the appointing authority’s
power to remove them.62 The Court wrote:
The power to remove inferior executive officers, like
that to remove superior executive officers, is an incident
of the power to appoint them, and is in its nature an
executive power. The authority of Congress given by the
excepting clause to vest the appointment of such
inferior officers in the heads of departments carries
with it authority incidentally to invest the heads of
departments with power to remove. It has been the
practice of Congress to do so and this Court has
recognized that power. The Court also has recognized in
the Perkins Case that Congress, in committing the
appointment of such inferior officers to the heads of
departments, may prescribe incidental regulations

59 See 116 U.S. 483, 483–84 (1886) (interpreting statutory language that “[n]o officer in the
military or naval service shall in time of peace be dismissed from service except upon and in
pursuance of the sentence of a court-martial to that effect or in continuation thereof”).
60 Id. at 485.
61 Id.
62 272 U.S. at 161.
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controlling and restricting the latter in the exercise of
the power of removal.63
In addition to giving removal authority over inferior officers to
the person who had the power of appointment and permitting some
job security when that person is not the President,64 the Myers
Court also addressed the question of congressionally imposed
qualifications for officers whom either the President or others are
empowered to appoint:
It is argued that the denial of the legislative power to
regulate removals in some way involves the denial of
power to prescribe qualifications for office, or
reasonable classification for promotion, and yet that has
been often exercised. We see no conflict between the
latter power and that of appointment and removal,
provided of course that the qualifications do not so limit
selection and so trench upon executive choice as to be in
effect legislative designation.65
Myers and Perkins provided (and still provide) at least three ways
in which Congress may seek to protect Justice Department lawyers
and the Department itself from improper political interference.66
The first is by giving appointing and removal power to an inferior
officer or the courts, rather than to the President. The second is by
establishing qualifications for the Department’s officers, including
the Attorney General.67 Third, Congress can “prescribe incidental
regulations”68 that give inferior officers whom the President does
not appoint job security—a term of office, for example, or a
requirement of cause for removal. Later Supreme Court decisions
do not always discuss these options, focusing instead on the
President’s unqualified power to remove those officers that the
Id.
See supra note 58.
65 272 U.S. at 128.
66 Of course, these options are available to advance other policies, too.
67 See Myers, 272 U.S. at 129 (contending that while Congress does not have full power to
“make or withhold provision for removals of all appointed by the President,” it retains power
to prescribe “reasonable and relevant qualifications and rules of eligibility of appointees . . .
except as otherwise provided by the Constitution”).
68 Id. at 161.
63
64
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President is authorized to appoint. For example, in Seila Law,
Roberts wrote:
The Court recognized the President's prerogative to
remove executive officials in [Myers]. Chief Justice Taft,
writing for the Court, conducted an exhaustive
examination of the First Congress's determination in
1789, the views of the Framers and their
contemporaries, historical practice, and our precedents
up until that point. He concluded that Article II “grants
to the President” the “general administrative control of
those executing the laws, including the power of
appointment and removal of executive officers.” Just as
the President's “selection of administrative officers is
essential to the execution of the laws by him, so must be
his power of removing those for whom he cannot
continue to be responsible. [T]o hold otherwise,” the
Court reasoned, “would make it impossible for the
President . . . to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed.”69
The Court gave Perkins only brief mention.70 A decade earlier
Roberts was more respectful. In Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co.
Accounting Oversight Board, the Court considered “the removal of
inferior officers, whose appointment Congress may vest in heads of
departments. If Congress does so, it is ordinarily the department
head, rather than the President, who enjoys the power of
removal . . . This Court has upheld for-cause limitations on that
power as well.”71 Putting aside the ambiguous and unexplained
adverb “ordinarily,” as recently as 2010, the Court wrote that the
President could not remove an inferior officer appointed by the head

69 Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183 2198–99 (2020)
(alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Myer, 272 U.S. at 117, 163–64) (rejecting
statutory job protection for a principal officer).
70 See id. at 2192 (“[I]n [Perkins] . . . we held that Congress could provide tenure protections
to certain inferior officers with narrowly defined duties.”); id. at 2199 (“In Perkins, we upheld
tenure protections for a naval cadet-engineer.”); id. at 2236 (noting that the Perkins Court
“allowed Congress to restrict the President’s removal power over inferior officers") (Kagan,
J., concurring).
71 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 493 (2010).
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of a department.72 Quoting Perkins, the Court wrote that Congress
“may limit and restrict the power of removal as it deems best for the
public interest.”73 These propositions have never been limited.
Consequently, a President who wishes to fire an inferior officer
appointed by the head of a department must instruct the latter to
do so or, if they will not, the President must fire the department
head and choose someone who will, assuming that doing so will not
violate the job security Congress may have provided.
At this point, it makes sense to step back from a strict chronology
and look at cases where the inferior officer was a prosecutor. The
authority of three high profile prosecutors was challenged between
1974 and 2019.74 In each, two from the Supreme Court and one from
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, the Courts
rejected a challenge to a prosecutor’s authority.
In United States v. Nixon, the President, citing executive
privilege, challenged a subpoena from a Special Prosecutor, Leon
Jaworski, to whom the acting Attorney General had delegated
criminal enforcement powers pursuant to his statutory authority.75
Jaworski was given power as a Special Prosecutor including:
“[P]lenary authority to control the course of
investigations and litigation related to “all offenses
arising out of the 1972 Presidential Election for which
the Special Prosecutor deems it necessary and
appropriate to assume responsibility, allegations
involving the President, members of the White House
staff, or Presidential appointees, and any other matters
See id. at 483 (“[T]he Court sustained similar restrictions on the power of principal
executive officers—themselves responsible to the President—to remove their own inferiors.”).
73 Id. at 494.
74 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 684 (1974) (holding that “power to contest the
invocation of executive privilege in seeking evidence” was validly conferred to the Special
Prosecutor by the Attorney General); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 654 (1988) (noting that
the constitutional question before the Court was the authority of the government's
Independent Counsel under the Ethics in Government Act to compel production of
documents); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 916 F.3d 1047, 1049–51 (D.C. Cir. 2019)
(affirming the lower court’s finding of civil contempt for an individual’s failure to produce
documents requested by Special Counsel).
75 Nixon, 418 U.S. at 686; see also 28 U.S.C. § 510 (“The Attorney General may from time
to time make such provisions as he considers appropriate authorizing the performance by any
other officer, employee, or agency of the Department of Justice of any function of the Attorney
General.”).
72
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which he consents to have assigned to him by the
Attorney General.” In particular, the Special Prosecutor
was given full authority, inter alia, “to contest the
assertion of ‘Executive Privilege’ . . . and handl[e] all
aspects of any cases within his jurisdiction.” The
regulation then goes on to provide [that] . . . “The
Attorney General will not countermand or interfere
with the Special Prosecutor's decisions or actions . . . .
In accordance with assurances given by the President
to the Attorney General that the President will not
exercise his Constitutional powers to effect the
discharge of the Special Prosecutor or to limit the
independence that he is hereby given, the Special
Prosecutor will not be removed from his duties except
for extraordinary improprieties on his part and without
the President's first consulting the Majority and the
Minority Leaders and Chairmen and ranking Minority
Members of the Judiciary Committees of the Senate and
House of Representatives and ascertaining that their
consensus is in accord with his proposed action.’”76
In upholding this broad grant of executive power, the Court wrote
that the Attorney General’s regulation “has the force of law” and
that the “Executive Branch is bound by it” as “long as [it] is
extant.”77 The Attorney General could, of course, “amend or revoke
the regulation defining the Special Prosecutor’s authority. But he
has not done so.”78 The Court relied on United States ex rel. Accardi
v. Shaughnessy,79 which held that “so long as the Attorney General's
regulations [which delegated authority to the Board of Immigration
Appeals] remained operative, he denied himself the authority to
exercise the discretion delegated to the Board even though the
original authority was his and he could reassert it by amending the
regulations.”80 The Court also cited Vitarelli v. Seaton81 which held
that since “the Secretary [of the Interior] gratuitously decided to
Nixon, 418 U.S. at 694 n.8 (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting 39 Fed.
Reg. 30739).
77 Id. at 695–96.
78 Id. at 696.
79 347 U.S. 260 (1954).
80 418 U.S. at 695 (citing the holding in Accardi).
81 359 U.S. 535 (1959).
76
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give a reason [for discharging an employee], and that reason was
national security, he was obligated to conform to the procedural
standards he had formulated . . . for dismissal of employees on
security grounds;”82 and Service v. Dulles,83 which held that, having
created discharge regulations, the Secretary of State “could not, so
long as the Regulations remained unchanged, proceed without
regard to them.”84
In other words, the Executive Branch could do to itself what
Congress may have lacked the power to do. It could tie its own
hands.85
While Jaworski’s executive authority was broad, it was also
provisional. The Attorney General could withdraw his power at any
time, without a finding of cause, by revoking the underlying
regulation.86 In this way, the Attorney General retained control over
the Special Prosecutor’s investigation and prosecution.87 And the
President did as well because he could instruct the Attorney
General to revoke the regulation and fire the Special Prosecutor, as
happened to Jaworski’s predecessor, Archibald Cox.88 The Court did
not say whether the President himself could revoke the regulation

Id. at 539.
354 U.S. 363 (1957).
84 Id. at 388.
85 But later Presidents could untie them. “Perhaps an individual President might find
advantages in tying his own hands. But the separation of powers does not depend on the view
of individual Presidents . . . nor on whether the ‘encroached-upon branch approves the
encroachment.” Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 497 (2010).
86 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 695 (1974) (“So long as this regulation is extant
it has the force of law. . . . [I]t is theoretically possible for the Attorney General to amend or
revoke the regulation defining the Special Prosecutor’s authority. But he has not done so. So
long as this regulation remains in force the Executive Branch is bound by it, and indeed the
United States as the sovereign composed of the three branches is bound to respect and to
enforce it.”); JARED P. COLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44857, SPECIAL COUNSEL INVESTIGATION:
HISTORY, AUTHORITY, APPOINTMENT AND REMOVAL 20–21 (2019) (“The Department could . . .
likely rescind the special counsel regulations without going through notice and comment
procedures, meaning that the regulations could likely be repealed immediately. Once
repealed, a special counsel would no longer be protected by a for-cause removal provision.”).
87 And, in this case, the Attorney General, William Saxbe, agreed with the regulation and
stated that he would not discharge the Special Prosecutor absent “gross impropriety.” See
Nixon, 418 U.S. at 696 n.10.
88 See Carroll Kilpatrick, Nixon Forces Firing of Cox; Richardson, Ruckelshaus Quit, WASH.
POST, Oct. 21, 1973, at A01 (explaining how the acting Attorney General, Robert Bork, carried
out President Nixon’s orders and fired Cox).
82
83
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and fire the Special Prosecutor directly, eliminating the
middleman.89 But fairly read, Myers and Perkins say he could not.
Matters became more complicated in Morrison v. Olsen.90 The
Ethics in Government Act of 1978 gave power to appoint an
Independent Counsel to a special court on application of the
Attorney General.91 The court appointed Alexia Morrison.92 She had
broad authority to investigate and prosecute Executive Branch
officers.93 Morrison was an inferior officer.94 Under the Act, she
could be removed only for cause,95 protection that neither the
Attorney General, nor even the President, could withdraw because
unlike Nixon, it rested on legislation giving appointing authority to
a special court, not on a Justice Department regulation.96 That
protection might have been seen as unconstitutional because it
interfered with the President’s take care responsibility, as the Court
89 The Court called Jaworski a “subordinate officer,” not an “inferior officer.” Nixon, 418
U.S. at 694. The Attorney General’s authority to appoint him did not rely on a congressional
grant under the Appointments Clause, but instead on a statute that authorized the Attorney
General to delegate criminal law enforcement powers. Id. at 684 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 509, 510,
515, 533). The statute had the same effect as would congressional action explicitly creating
Jaworski’s position and giving the Attorney General the power to appoint him. The statute’s
delegation of this authority would seem to empower the Attorney General to appoint inferior
officers without need for additional congressional action. The appointee need not be described
as an “inferior officer,” as Jaworski was not.
90 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
91 See 28 U.S.C. § 592(c)(1)(A) (allowing the Attorney General to file for Independent
Counsel if “there are reasonable grounds to believe further investigation is warranted”).
92 See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 667 (replacing former Independent Counsel, James McKay, to
determine if the subjects of the investigation had violated any laws in their sworn
testimonies).
93 See id. (recognizing Independent Counsel's authority to investigate and determine
whether the subjects of investigation had violated any laws in their sworn testimony and
granting power to prosecute any such violation).
94 See id. at 671 (noting that the line between “inferior” and “principal” officers is difficult
to discern, but that Morrison “clearly falls on the ‘inferior office’” side of that line).
95 See id. at 663 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1), providing that Independent Counsel appointed
under this statute may be removed “only for good cause, physical disability, mental
incapacity, or any other condition that substantially impairs the performance of such
independent counsel’s duties”).
96 See id. at 664 (“[T]he Special Division, acting either on its own or on the suggestion of
the Attorney General, may terminate the office of an independent counsel at any time if it
finds that ‘the investigation of all matters within the prosecutorial jurisdiction of such
independent counsel . . . have been completed or so substantially completed that it would be
appropriate for the Department of Justice to complete such investigations and prosecutions.’”
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 596(b)(2))).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol57/iss1/4

24

Gillers: Because They Are Lawyers First

2022]

BECAUSE THEY ARE LAWYERS FIRST

187

recognized.97 But the Court held that the appointment was
nonetheless lawful.98 The Attorney General retained sufficient
power. He alone decided whether an Independent Counsel should
be appointed.99 The court defined her jurisdiction “with reference to
the facts submitted by the Attorney General.”100 Once appointed,
the Independent Counsel was required to “abide by Justice
Department policy unless it is not ‘possible’ to do so.”101
The Court credited the congressional purpose behind the Act’s
interference with the President’s take care authority.102 In
upholding the statute’s provision for judicial appointment of an
Independent Counsel, the Court cited the congressional concern
with “conflicts of interest that could arise in situations when the
Executive Branch is called upon to investigate its own high-ranking
officers.”103 And it characterized the “for cause” removal limitation
as “essential, in the view of Congress, to establish the necessary
independence of the office [of the Attorney General].”104 Recognition
of that interest would also support a fixed term, job protection, or
both, for the Justice Department’s Inspector General, as is proposed
in legislation that would also return to the Inspector General the

See id. at 689–90 (identifying the need to ensure that Congress does not interfere with
the President’s duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed). The Court added a
caution:
We do not mean to say that Congress' power to provide for interbranch
appointments of “inferior officers” is unlimited. In addition to separation-ofpowers concerns, which would arise if such provisions for appointment had
the potential to impair the constitutional functions assigned to one of the
branches, Siebold itself suggested that Congress' decision to vest the
appointment power in the courts would be improper if there was some
“incongruity” between the functions normally performed by the courts and
the performance of their duty to appoint.
Id. at 675–76 (citing Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 398 (1880)).
98 Id. at 659–60.
99 See id. at 660–61 (outlining the process of Independent Counsel appointments and
emphasizing the Attorney General’s role in initiating contact with the Special Division).
100 Id. at 696.
101 Id.
102 See id. at 692–93 (finding that the Act did not “impermissibly burden the President's
power” under Article II to remove executive officials as it balanced limitations on this power
with Congress's strong interest in maintaining the “necessary independence of the office” of
the Attorney General).
103 Id. at 677.
104 Id. at 693.
97
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authority to investigate allegations of misconduct by Department
attorneys.105
In the final case in this trilogy, the acting Attorney General
appointed Robert Mueller as a “Special Counsel” with job
security.106 Like Jaworski but unlike Morrison, whom a court
appointed under a statutory grant of authority,107 the appointment
of Mueller relied on a statute authorizing the Attorney General to
delegate law enforcement authority.108 Mueller was charged to
“investigate the Russian Government’s efforts to interfere in the
2016 presidential election and ‘related matters’ and to prosecute
any federal crimes uncovered during the investigation.”109 Because
the Supreme Court had upheld the appointment of Morrison as an
Independent Counsel pursuant to a statute that gave the Attorney
General even less control over her than the acting Attorney General
had over Mueller, it would seem to follow that the Department’s
regulations and Mueller’s appointment should also be upheld,
which is what the D.C. Circuit did.110 Mueller, the court wrote, was
“subject to greater executive oversight” than was Morrison.111
Congress had given the acting Attorney General the power to
appoint Mueller just as it had authorized the acting Attorney
General to appoint Jaworski in Nixon.112 Because the Attorney
General could rescind the appointment or amend it to eliminate the
“for cause” limitations on removal, Mueller, an inferior officer,
“effectively serves at the pleasure of an Executive Branch officer
105 In 1988, Congress had required the Inspector General to refer those allegations of
misconduct involving Department of Justice personnel to the Department’s Office of
Professional Responsibility. 5 U.S.C. app. § 8E(b)(3). House Bill 2662 would eliminate this
requirement and give Inspectors General job security. H.R. 2662, 117th Cong. (2021).
106 See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 916 F.3d 1047, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (noting that
the Special Counsel may be removed by the Attorney General for “good cause”).
107 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 661.
108 See Grand Jury Investigation, 916 F.3d at 1054 (“Because binding precedent establishes
that Congress has ‘by law’ vested authority in the Attorney General to appoint the Special
Counsel as an inferior officer, this court has no need to go further to identify the specific
sources of this authority.”).
109 Id. at 1051.
110 See id. at 1056 (holding that a challenge to the appointment of Mueller as Special
Counsel failed).
111 Id. at 1052.
112 See id. at 1053 (stating that the question of whether Congress had “by law” vested the
power to appoint a Special Counsel in the Attorney General had already been decided by the
Supreme Court in Nixon).
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who was appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate.”113
That satisfied the Appointments Clause.114
I return now to the chronology of cases that do not concern
prosecutors. In Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau,115 the Court distinguished Morrison. Morrison was an
inferior officer with limited powers. The Director of the CFPB was
a presidential appointee with broad powers.116 Consequentially, the
Court concluded that legislation giving the Director job security
violated the Appointments Clause, explaining that:
[I]n Morrison, we upheld a provision granting goodcause tenure protection to an independent counsel
appointed to investigate and prosecute particular
alleged
crimes
by
high-ranking
Government
officials. . . . [W]e viewed the ultimate question as
whether a removal restriction is of “such a nature that
[it] impede[s] the President’s ability to perform his
constitutional duty.” Although the independent counsel
was a single person and performed “law enforcement
functions that typically have been undertaken by
officials within the Executive Branch,” we concluded
that the removal protections did not unduly interfere
with the functioning of the Executive Branch because
“the independent counsel [was] an inferior officer under
the Appointments Clause, with limited jurisdiction and
tenure and lacking policymaking or significant
administrative authority.”117
A year later, in Collins v. Yellen, the Court explained yet again
the reasons behind its interpretation of executive power.118 Any
Id. at 1052.
Id. at 1054.
115 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020).
116 See id. at 2200 (establishing that the role of the CFPB director “brings coercive power
of the state to bear on millions of private citizens and businesses” unlike the Independent
Counsel in Morrison “who lacked policy-making or administrative authority”).
117 Id. at 2199 (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Morrison v. Olson, 487
U.S. 654, 691 (1988)). Because the Independent Counsel was “a single person,” her tenure
protection could not rest on the holding in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S.
602, 629 (1935), which “permitted Congress to give for-cause removal protections to a
multimember body of experts.” Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2199.
118 Collins v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761, 1784–87 (2021).
113
114
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effort to protect the independence of Justice Department officers
must respect this explanation.119 The question in Collins, as in Seila
Law, was whether job protection for the Director of the Federal
Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), a presidential appointee, was
constitutional. It was not, the Court held, because the Director was
a principal officer whom the President had to be able to fire at will.
Justification for this holding again relied on the Court’s view of
what democracy required:
The President’s removal power serves vital purposes
even when the officer subject to removal is not the head
of one of the largest and most powerful agencies. The
removal power helps the President maintain a degree of
control over the subordinates he needs to carry out his
duties as the head of the Executive Branch, and it works
to ensure that these subordinates serve the people
effectively and in accordance with the policies that the
people presumably elected the President to promote. In
addition, because the President, unlike agency officials,
is elected, this control is essential to subject Executive
Branch actions to a degree of electoral accountability.
At-will removal ensures that “the lowest officers, the
middle grade, and the highest, will depend, as they
ought, on the President, and the President on the
community.”120
The Court rejected the argument that a different rule should
apply in Collins because the authority of the FHFA Director was
more limited than the authority of the CFPB Director in Seila
Law.121 “These purposes are implicated whenever an agency does
important work, and nothing about the size or role of the FHFA

119 See id. at 1784 (citing the President's interest in a degree of control of subordinates to
carry out his duties and that this control is essential to accountability to the electorate and
explaining that “[t]hese purposes are implicated whenever an agency does important work”).
120 Id. at 1784 (citations omitted) (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight
Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 498 (2010)).
121 See id. at 1785 (“Courts are not well-suited to weigh the relative importance of the
regulatory and enforcement authority of disparate agencies, and we do not think that the
constitutionality of removal restrictions hinges on such an inquiry.”).
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convinces us that its Director should be treated differently from the
Director of the CFPB.”122
Collins also rejected an amicus argument that tenure protection
for the FHFA Director was weaker than it was for the CFPB
Director, giving the President greater removal authority than was
true of equivalent language that the Court had held invalid in Seila
Law.123 Apparently, any restriction was too much:
[A]s we explained last Term, the Constitution prohibits
even “modest restrictions” on the President’s power to
remove the head of an agency with a single top officer.
The President must be able to remove not just officers
who disobey his commands but also those he finds
“negligent and inefficient,” those who exercise their
discretion in a way that is not “intelligen[t] or wis[e],”
those who have “different views of policy,” those who
come “from a competing political party who is dead set
against [the President’s] agenda,” and those in whom he
has simply lost confidence. Amicus recognizes that “‘for
cause’ . . . does not mean the same thing as ‘at will,’” and
therefore the removal restriction in the Recovery Act
violates the separation of powers.124
What remains of Perkins and Myers today? Or perhaps the
question is better asked this way: With regard to the appointment
and removal of principal and inferior officers, what can Congress
now do and not do to limit or control how Presidents exercise their
power? A good deal, as it happens. The case law should not be read
to impose greater limits on the constitutional powers of Congress
than their reasoning and facts fairly warrant. Certainly, Congress
cannot override the President’s ability to remove any officer it or the
Constitution authorizes him to appoint or give to itself the power to
appoint and remove executive officers.125 But there are other ways
Id. at 1784.
See id. at 1786–87 (explaining that while the removal provisions for the FHFA Director
were less restrictive from ones previously assessed, it did not equate to “at will” employment
and therefore was unconstitutional).
124 Id. at 1787 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
125 See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726–27, 734 (1986) (explaining that the
Constitution does not grant Congress the power to intrude upon inherent or legislatively
granted independent agencies of the Executive Branch).
122
123
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to protect the Justice Department from an unfaithful President in
addition to those noted earlier,126 most prominently, as discussed in
Part VI, through the obligations lawyers have under rules of
professional conduct in the jurisdictions in which they are admitted
or in which they practice.

IV. CONGRESS CAN IMPOSE QUALIFICATIONS AND CONDITIONS
FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF PRINCIPAL AND INFERIOR OFFICERS
Ideally, government lawyers will resist a President’s faithless
instructions before they cause harm. This may be another way of
saying that “[c]haracter is destiny,” an insight attributed to
Heraclitus.127 But how do we legislate character? Because the
Senate must confirm an Attorney General nominee and may need
to confirm inferior officers, it can demand persuasive assurance that
nominees will resist improper political interference even if it means
the loss of a job. But that check is weak if the President’s party
controls the Senate.128 Even when the opposite party controls the
Senate, it may hesitate to create a precedent that frustrates a future
President of its own.129 And assurances cannot be enforced.
Compliance relies on the nominee’s good character and perhaps
capacity for shame if she ignores the assurances.130
So it would make sense to legislate qualifications for the Attorney
General and inferior officers that will encourage the appointment of
people of good character. Congress, exercising its power under the
126 See supra text accompanying notes 60–71 (discussing congressional methods to insulate
Department of Justice officials from political pressures, including establishing qualifications
for an office, giving the power to appoint and remove inferior officers to the head of a
department, and giving those appointees some measure of job protection).
127 See Ronald J. Colombo, Toward a Nexus of Virtue, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 82 (2012)
(quoting HERACLITUS, ON THE UNIVERSE fragment 1, 121 (W.H.S. Jones trans., Loeb Classical
Library 1931)) (arguing that virtue and character should be foundational values in corporate
governance).
128 See Henry Paul Monaghan, The Confirmation Process: Law or Politics?, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1202, 1204 (1988) (arguing, among other things, that the nomination process
experiences significant political pressures from the President, where the President uses
resources like “party discipline, ideology, and various carrots and sticks” to ensure partyaligned voting).
129 See id. at 1207 (noting the Senate's tendency to engage in various political and social
considerations in its decision-making during appointment).
130 For a discussion on the importance of character in, but not limited to, the law, see
generally DEBORAH L. RHODE, CHARACTER: WHAT IT MEANS AND WHY IT MATTERS (2019).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol57/iss1/4

30

Gillers: Because They Are Lawyers First

2022]

BECAUSE THEY ARE LAWYERS FIRST

193

Appointments Clause, established the office of the Attorney
General: “The President shall appoint, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, an Attorney General of the United States.
The Attorney General is the head of the Department of Justice.”131
Yet Congress has gone further. In many ways, discussed below,132
Congress has established the structures through which the
President executes the laws. Presidents implicitly accept those
structures when they nominate principal and inferior officers and
then, after confirmation, execute the laws through them.133
Congress can yet do more. It can, without trespassing on the
President’s take care authority, identify the qualifications for the
Attorney General and the inferior officers whose positions Article II
authorizes Congress to establish.134 So the Supreme Court told us
in Myers v. United States.135
Congress has in fact prescribed qualifications for some Justice
Department positions and for Executive Department officers
elsewhere.136 The qualifications and other conditions described
below are general. They are not “in effect legislative
designation[s].”137 While legislation will not bind a future Congress,
repeal will require a majority of both Houses.138 Repeal would mean
that Congress is eliminating nonpartisan conditions that benefit the
country and that an earlier Congress thought important enough to
require.
The qualifications for all Justice Department lawyers should
include, most obviously, bar membership for a minimum number of
years and no serious professional discipline or judicially imposed
28 U.S.C. § 503.
See infra text accompany notes 142–159.
133 An interesting question is whether a President could seek to execute the laws through
officers other than those whose positions were established by Congress.
134 Article II provides for the appointment of “all other Officers of the United States, whose
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law.”
U.S. CONST art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
135 See supra text accompanying note 65.
136 See infra text accompanying notes 142–159 (highlighting the various formal and
informal qualifications imposed by Congress on Justice Department and other officials).
137 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 128 (1926).
138 See U.S. CONST. art I, § 7 (requiring a majority of both houses to create new statutes,
including statutes which repeal older statutes); Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. 260, 274
(2012) (“[S]tatutes enacted by one Congress cannot bind a later Congress, which remains free
to repeal the earlier statute, to exempt the current statute from the earlier statute, to modify
the earlier statute, or to apply the earlier statute but as modified.”).
131
132
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sanctions. Congress should also exclude anyone who within a prior
number of years (five seems reasonable) was an elected official, a
party official, or a candidate for political office; anyone who was
active in the presidential election contest whether or not as part of
a campaign; anyone within a certain degree of familial relationship
to the President; and anyone who was a business or law partner of
the President within a prior number of years (five seems reasonable
here, too).139
Beyond these qualifications, Congress should require that a
nominee acknowledge that the Justice Department’s client is the
United States acting through its officers and employees. 140 It can
declare the same in legislation. Nominees should be required to
acknowledge that they are subject to court imposed professional
conduct rules of a specified jurisdiction (more on this in Part V).
Congress can legislate—and can ask the nominee to commit to—
limits on communications between others in the Executive Branch
and Department personnel and require that the Department
preserve and produce defined categories of intradepartmental
communications if requested by the House and Senate judiciary
committees or their chairs and ranking members.141 Congress can
ask nominees to say what they would do in specific situations where
the President’s instructions appear to conflict with the
Department’s responsibility for the administration of justice and
the interests of the United States. Nominees can be asked for their
views on the meaning of “faithfully” in Article II and to give
examples of conduct that would be the unfaithful execution of the
laws. None of these qualifications and requirements interferes with
the President’s take care authority as defined by the cases in Part
III. They no more intrude on that authority than much else
Congress has done and said. In the McDade Amendment (discussed
in Part V), Congress has prescribed the ethics rules that govern all
federal lawyers, including at the Justice Department.142 Congress
139 Each of these criteria is capable of unambiguous definition except the status of having
been “active” in the election contest. Congress will have to establish a common understanding
through its confirmation decisions.
140 See infra text accompanying note 189 (noting parallel language in Model Rule 1.13,
whose focus is lawyers for organizations including a government).
141
For a historical context of limitations on communications in presidential
administrations, see SUBVERTING JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 7–8.
142 See 28 U.S.C. § 530B (applying state and federal ethics rules to “attorney[s] for the
Government”).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol57/iss1/4

32

Gillers: Because They Are Lawyers First

2022]

BECAUSE THEY ARE LAWYERS FIRST

195

has, with limited exceptions, designated the Department as the
Agency that will represent the United States in court.143 While the
President is authorized to appoint a Deputy and an Associate
Attorney General,144 he is required to appoint a Solicitor General
and eleven Assistant Attorneys General.145 The President must
designate one of the mandated Assistant Attorneys General to be
the Assistant Attorney General for National Security, whose duties
Congress has described.146 Congress has created a “National
Security Division of the Department of Justice” and defined its
mission.147 Congress has also prescribed a section within the
Department’s criminal division “with responsibility for enforcement
of laws against suspected participants in serious human rights
offenses.”148 Congress has instructed the Attorney General to adopt
certain conflict of interest rules for Department lawyers.149
Congress has specified the required domicile of United States

See 28 U.S.C. § 516 (“Except as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of litigation in
which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, or is interested, and securing
evidence therefor, is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, under the direction of
the Attorney General.”).
144 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 504, 504a (explaining that the President “may appoint, by and with the
consent of the Senate,” both a Deputy Attorney General and an Associate Attorney General).
145 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 505–506 (the President “shall appoint” a Solicitor General and eleven
Assistant Attorneys General to assist the Attorney General).
146 See 28 U.S.C. § 507A(b) (“The Assistant Attorney General for National Security shall:
(1) serve as the head of the National Security Division of the Department of Justice under
section 509A of this title; (2) serve as primary liaison to the Director of National Intelligence
for the Department of Justice; and (3) perform such other duties as the Attorney General may
prescribe.”).
147 See 28 U.S.C. § 509A (“The National Security Division shall consist of the elements of
the Department of Justice (other than the Federal Bureau of Investigation) engaged
primarily in support of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States
Government . . . .”).
148 28 U.S.C. § 509B.
149 28 U.S.C. § 528 provides:
The Attorney General shall promulgate rules and regulations which
require the disqualification of any officer or employee of the Department of
Justice, including a United States attorney or a member of such attorney’s
staff, from participation in a particular investigation or prosecution if such
participation may result in a personal, financial, or political conflict of
interest, or the appearance thereof. Such rules and regulations may provide
that a willful violation of any provision thereof shall result in removal from
office.
143
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Attorneys and Assistant United States Attorneys.150 The
Department is directed to file several annual, or more frequent,
reports.151 For example, by April 1 of each year, the Attorney
General must “report to Congress on the Department of Justice's
business for the preceding fiscal year,”152 report annually on a host
of detailed information dealing with public corruption and grants,153
and report within prescribed time limits certain other information
about Department decisions.154
There’s more. Congress has also decided how vacancies in the
office of the Attorney General will be filled. In the event of a
vacancy, specified inferior Department officers assume the duties of
the Attorney General without Senate confirmation until the
President nominates and the Senate confirms a new Attorney
General.155 The President may also fill a vacancy from outside the
Department with a person previously confirmed by the Senate and
that person can continue in an “acting” capacity for as many as three
210-day periods.156 The Justice Department is not alone in this
regard. Congress has chosen to describe the responsibilities of
officials in other executive departments or the structures of other
departments, including the Department of State,157 the Federal

150 See 28 U.S.C. § 545 (requiring United States Attorneys to reside in the district for which
they are appointed, with minimal exceptions).
151 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 522, 529 (detailing the Attorney General’s reporting duties).
152 28 U.S.C. § 522.
153 See 28 U.S.C. § 529 (identifying criminal violations by specified persons and grant
information that the Attorney General must include in the report).
154 See id. (setting deadlines for the Attorney General’s report).
155 See 28 U.S.C. § 508 (explaining who takes responsibility if the Attorney General office
is vacant and noting that the replacement during such a vacancy “may exercise all the duties
of that office”).
156 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 3345–3346 (discussing how the functions of a vacant office can be
performed, by whom, and for what specified time periods while awaiting Senate confirmation
or in the aftermath of a Senate rejection). To ensure compliance with the qualifications and
conditions proposed in this Article, the vacancy statutes should be amended to impose the
same qualifications and conditions for officials who fill a vacancy in the office of the Attorney
General or the Department’s inferior offices, unless those officials have already subscribed to
them in their own confirmation hearings.
157 See 22 U.S.C. § 2651a (describing the organizational structure and duties of personnel
within the Department of State, including the Secretary of State, Under Secretaries, and
Assistant Secretaries).
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Emergency Management Agency,158 and the Department of the
Treasury.159
In short, the nation has, through its actions, rejected the idea
that the Department of Justice or other executive departments in
some sense “belong” to the President lock, stock, and barrel,
undermining the argument that the President possesses “all of it”
(i.e., Executive Power). Or, that once Congress has legislated the
Department and its officers into existence, the President can do
with them as he wishes or even ignore them. The line of cases from
Myers to the present holds only that the take care duty prevents
Congress from giving Executive Branch officers whom the President
appoints a fixed term or for cause job protection.160
Congress could also minimize improper political interference by
giving the authority to appoint inferior officers to the Attorney
General. Both Nixon and In re Grand Jury Investigation read the
Attorney General’s statutory delegation of authority as sufficient to
allow appointment of an inferior (or in Nixon a subordinate)
officer.161 Where the President does not appoint inferior officers, he
will not have the authority to remove them.162 It is an open question,
however, whether the Court would let Congress give authority to
appoint all or most Justice Department inferior officers to the
Attorney General or the courts, despite the absence of any
limitation on the congressional power in Article II, or whether it
would see such a move as too great an intrusion on the President’s
take care responsibility.163 The President could, of course, always
order an Attorney General to remove his or her own appointees,
although the Attorney General would need to have cause if the

158 See 6 U.S.C. § 313(c)(2) (“The Administrator [of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency] shall be appointed from among individuals who have, (A) a demonstrated ability in
and knowledge of emergency management and homeland security; and (B) not less than 5
years of executive leadership and management experience in the public or private sector.”).
159 See 31 U.S.C. § 321 (outlining the duties and powers that comprise the general authority
of the Secretary of the Treasury).
160 See supra Part III (addressing the Court’s interpretation of the Appointments Clause,
the Take Care Clause, and Executive Power).
161 See supra text accompanying notes 74, 106.
162 See supra text accompanying notes 60, 70–71.
163 The decisions upholding the non-presidential appointments of Leon Jaworski and Alexia
Morrison as, respectively, a Special Prosecutor and an Independent Counsel, suggest that the
Court is willing to accept the appointment of inferior officers with significant powers. See
supra notes 74, 90.
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position so requires.164 The Attorney General could then either
refuse and resign, or the President could remove the Attorney
General and appoint a more compliant one.165 But that course can
have negative political consequences. After engineering the removal
of Archibald Cox, Nixon was forced to accept the appointment of
Leon Jaworski as a Special Prosecutor charged to investigate the
President and others, setting in motion a series of events
culminating in Nixon’s resignation.166

V. THE PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULES THAT GOVERN
FEDERAL LAWYERS
My premise is that it would not be the faithful execution of the
laws to direct Justice Department lawyers to violate professional
conduct rules of state and federal courts where the lawyers are
admitted or where they practice.167 So we must identify the
jurisdictions whose rules govern department lawyers.
Following his acquittal on federal criminal charges,
Representative Joseph McDade of Pennsylvania returned to
Congress and introduced a bill to prescribe the ethics rules
governing lawyers for the federal government, including
prosecutors.168 The law passed and has come to be known as the
McDade Amendment. It provides:
(a) An attorney for the Government shall be subject to
State laws and rules, and local Federal court rules,
governing attorneys in each State where such attorney
engages in that attorney’s duties, to the same extent
See supra text accompanying note 71.
See supra text accompanying notes 70–73.
166 Daniel Bush, The Complete Watergate Timeline (It Took Longer Than You Realize), PBS
NEWS HOUR (May 30, 2017), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/complete-watergatetimeline-took-longer-realize (providing a chronological order of the events leading to Nixon’s
resignation).
167 We might question the validity of a court rule that limited the work of Justice
Department lawyers without appreciably advancing any judicial interest. Such a rule might
be said to impermissibly clash with the President’s constitutional powers. But the general
rules discussed in Part VI do not do that.
168 See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., MCDADE-MURTHA AMENDMENT: LEGISLATION
IN THE 107TH CONGRESS CONCERNING ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR JUSTICE DEPARTMENT 1–2
(2001) (discussing proposed amendments to the Justice Department appropriations act
requiring litigators to adhere to jurisdictional ethical standards).
164
165
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and in the same manner as other attorneys in that
State.
(b) The Attorney General shall make and amend rules
of the Department of Justice to assure compliance with
this section.
(c) As used in this section, the term “attorney for the
Government” includes any attorney described in section
77.2(a) of part 77 of title 28 of the Code of Federal
Regulations and also includes any independent counsel,
or employee of such a counsel, appointed under chapter
40.169
The Justice Department, which previously had unsuccessfully
claimed that it had the authority to write the ethics rules for its own
lawyers,170 then adopted regulations to implement the McDade
Amendment.171 There is discrepancy between the McDade
Amendment and the Department’s regulations. The regulations say
that where there is no case pending in court, the attorney should
comply with “the rules of ethical conduct that would be applied by
the attorney’s state of licensure.”172 The McDade Amendment says
nothing about the rules of the state of licensure, referring instead
to the place “where such attorney engages in that attorney’s
duties.”173 So Justice Department lawyers admitted only in New
York but who engage in their duties in Washington, D.C., which the

28 U.S.C. § 530B.
See United States ex rel. O’Keefe v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 132 F.3d 1252, 1257 (8th
Cir. 1998) (“The district court correctly concluded that nothing in any of these [Title 28]
sections expressly or impliedly gives the Attorney General the authority to exempt lawyers
representing the United States from the local rules of ethics which bind all other lawyers
appearing in that court of the United States.”).
171 See 28 C.F.R. § 77.1 (“The Department of Justice is committed to ensuring that its
attorneys perform their duties in accordance with the highest ethical standards. The purpose
of this part is to implement 28 U.S.C. 530B [the McDade Amendment] and to provide
guidance to attorneys concerning the requirements imposed on Department attorneys by 28
U.S.C. § 530B.”).
172 28 C.F.R. § 77.2(j)(1)(ii).
173 28 U.S.C. § 530(B)(a) (referring to “where such attorney engages in that attorney’s
duties”).
169
170
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District’s rules permit,174 would be governed by the District’s rules
in all matters whether or not in court.
What did the McDade Amendment actually accomplish apart
from expressing McDade’s own displeasure with the conduct of the
lawyers who prosecuted him? The Amendment seems to be a choice
of rule provision. Once it was established that the Justice
Department could not promulgate its own ethics rules for
Department lawyers, there remained only a decision about the
choice of governing rule. No one argued that these lawyers operated
in an ethics free universe. Rules from somewhere were going to
govern them. But where? The McDade Amendment tells us that it
will be the rules where the lawyers are working even if they are not
admitted there. Justice Department lawyers, including Department
officers based in Washington, D.C., must comply with the ethics
rules promulgated by the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, regardless of where they are admitted.
And what if they don’t? The McDade Amendment has no
enforcement provision. It implicitly defers to traditional
disciplinary authorities for when lawyers violate ethics rules.175 If
the matter is before a court, the court’s rules will apply if the
jurisdiction in which the lawyers work has adopted the ABA choice
of rule provision, which Washington D.C. has.176 (A court can also
respond to misconduct through its inherent or other statutory
power.177) If a matter is not in court—and the Attorney General and

174 See D.C. APP. R. 49(c)(1) (“A person who is not a D.C. Bar Member may provide legal
services to the United States as an employee of the United States and may hold out as
authorized to provide those services.”).
175 See Hopi Costello, Note, Judicial Interpretation of State Ethics Rules Under the McDade
Amendment: Do Federal or State Courts Get the Last Word?, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 201, 224
(2015) (noting that while legislative history shows that this enforcement issue was raised,
there is no indication of “congressional intent as to which court system has ultimate
interpretative authority under the Act”).
176 See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.5(b)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (outlining the
ABA choice of rule provision); D.C. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.5(b) (D.C. BAR 2022)
(explaining the Washington, D.C. choice of rule provision).
177 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (creating sanction power by the court to require parties who
“unreasonably and vexatiously” multiply proceedings to pay excess costs, expenses, and
attorneys’ fees because of such conduct); Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 42 (1991)
(discussing a court’s reliance on its inherent power to impose sanctions, a power that is most
appropriate to wield when a fraud has been perpetrated on the Court); Crowe v. Smith, 151
F.3d 217, 240 (5th Cir. 1998) (explaining a court’s inherent power to impose sanctions
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the inferior officers at the Justice Department other than lawyers
who work in the office of the Solicitor General and the United States
Attorney are less likely to appear in court—the governing rules will
be those “of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer’s conduct occurred”
or where the “predominant effect” of the lawyer’s conduct occurs.178
It may be overly optimistic to expect that local disciplinary
committees and courts, especially state courts, would be willing to
investigate and sanction senior Justice Department officials.179 But
even if the McDade Amendment does not appreciably increase or
decrease the risk of discipline of federal lawyers by local authorities,
and instead merely identifies the source of the rules that govern
them, it does do something else that can prove more consequential.
Backed now by a congressional mandate that does not aggrandize
power for Congress but rather invokes judicial power, it gives the
Department’s lawyers a judicially and congressionally backed
reason to reject White House instructions that would put them in
violation of, or preempt their judicially granted discretion under,
governing professional conduct rules.

VI. WHAT THE MODEL RULES AND WASHINGTON, D.C. RULES
NOW SAY ABOUT GOVERNMENT LAWYERS
Preliminarily, it will be useful to identify what guidance the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the Washington, D.C.
Rules of Professional Conduct offer government lawyers.
Surprisingly little, as it happens. Later, I will propose a variation to

consisting of fines, reprimands, and suspensions in a “quasi-criminal” fashion as opposed to
restrictions on imposing criminal fines).
178 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.5(b)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
179 Or maybe not optimistic. Lower federal and state courts have held that federal
prosecutors must comply with professional conduct rules of their licensing state and with
local federal court rules incorporating them unless there is a superior federal interest. United
States v. Ferrara, 847 F. Supp. 964, 969 (D.D.C. 1993) (“[I]t appears that Congress intended
federal lawyers to be subject to regulation by the state bars of which they are members.”); In
re Howe, 940 P.2d 159, 164 (N.M. 1997) (“We are not persuaded that an attorney’s employer,
even though that employer may be an attorney or an arm of the United States government,
can create an ‘arguable question of professional duty’ . . . by the simple mechanism of
unilaterally declaring that a particular rule of conduct is burdensome and should not apply
to its employees.”).
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Rule 1.13 of the Model Rules to address the situation of the
government lawyer.180
A. THE MODEL RULES

Most provisions in the Model Rules do not distinguish among
practice areas. They treat all lawyers the same. For instance, Rule
1.7(a)(1) forbids all lawyers to represent a client who is “directly
adverse” to another current client.181 Rule 4.2 forbids all lawyers
who represent a client in a matter to communicate with another
lawyer’s client about the matter, with two exceptions.182 Rule 5.1
imposes the same obligations on all lawyers “having direct
supervisory authority over another lawyer.”183
Some rules, however, do address a lawyer’s practice setting. Rule
5.4(d), for example, forbids a lawyer to practice law in a for-profit
“professional corporation or association” if nonlawyers have
managerial or ownership interests in it.184 Other rules focus on
certain types of practice. Rule 1.13 governs lawyers for
organizations.185 Rule 3.3 applies to all lawyers who appear before
a tribunal.186 Rule 3.8 defines the “Special Responsibilities of a
Prosecutor.”187 Rule 1.11 contains the post-departure conflict rule
for lawyers who leave government jobs, whether or not as lawyers,
and the conflict rules for lawyers who move from private practice to
government jobs.188
See infra text accompanying notes 283–285 (describing proposed Model Rule 1.13A for
government lawyers).
181 See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.7(a)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (defining
simultaneous representation of directly adverse clients as an impermissible conflict of
interest); see generally Stephen Gillers, “Directly Adverse” Means Directly Adverse: How
Courts Have Misread Rule 1.7(a)(1) and Why It Matters, 98 DENVER. L. REV. 59 (2020)
(outlining guidelines for the correct application of Rule 1.7(a)(1) to determine whether a
representation should be considered directly adverse to a current client).
182 See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 4.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (stating that lawyers
cannot communicate with clients who are represented by another lawyer absent the lawyer’s
consent or as authorized by law).
183 See id. r. 5.1 (explaining the responsibilities of supervisory lawyers to ensure compliance
with the Model Rules).
184 Id. r. 5.4(d).
185 See id. r. 1.13 (containing ethical rules for lawyers who represent organizations).
186 See id. r. 3.3 (describing the obligations of lawyers who appear in tribunals).
187 See id. r. 3.8 (describing ethical duties of prosecutors including the duty to disclose
information that tends to negate the guilt of the defendant).
188 See id. r. 1.11 (containing conflict rules for current and former government lawyers).
180
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Some comments in the Rules mention government lawyers. Most
notable is comment 9 to Model Rule 1.13, which discusses lawyers
for organizations.189 The comment states that the rule “applies to
governmental organizations.”190 It recognizes the challenge in
identifying the client of the government lawyer. Important for the
current inquiry are these two sentences:
[I]n a matter involving the conduct of government
officials, a government lawyer may have authority
under applicable law to question such conduct more
extensively than that of a lawyer for a private
organization in similar circumstances. Thus, when the
client is a governmental organization, a different
balance may be appropriate between maintaining
confidentiality and assuring that the wrongful act is
prevented or rectified, for public business is involved.191
The Scope section of the Rules also addresses the singular role of
government lawyers. It recognizes that the law may give
government lawyers “authority concerning legal matters that
ordinarily reposes in the client in private client-lawyer
relationships,” including “to decide upon settlement or whether to
appeal from an adverse judgment.”192 Both comment 9 to Rule 1.13
and the Scope are careful to identify “applicable law” or “various
See id. r. 1.13 cmt. 9.
Id.
191 Id.
192 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT Scope ¶ 18 (AM. BAR ASS'N, 2020). The Scope provides
in full that:
Under various legal provisions, including constitutional, statutory and
common law, the responsibilities of government lawyers may include
authority concerning legal matters that ordinarily reposes in the client in
private client-lawyer relationships. For example, a lawyer for a government
agency may have authority on behalf of the government to decide upon
settlement or whether to appeal from an adverse judgment. Such authority
in various respects is generally vested in the attorney general and the state's
attorney in state government, and their federal counterparts, and the same
may be true of other government law officers. Also, lawyers under the
supervision of these officers may be authorized to represent several
government agencies in intragovernmental legal controversies in
circumstances where a private lawyer could not represent multiple private
clients. These Rules do not abrogate any such authority.
Id.
189
190
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legal provisions,” respectively, as a basis for different obligations
between a lawyer for a private organization and a government
lawyer.193
B. THE WASHINGTON, D.C. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT.

Because the McDade Amendment requires United States
government lawyers working in Washington, D.C. to comply with
the local professional conduct rules, regardless of their state of
admission and to the same extent as other lawyers in the District,
we seem to have what might be called a “legal wag the dog”
situation. By operation of the Amendment, when the D.C. Court of
Appeals adopts professional conduct rules for local lawyers, it
thereby prescribes the ethics rules for all Justice Department
lawyers practicing in the District, including the Attorney
General.194
In addition to the omission of comment 9 of Model Rule 1.13, the
Washington, D.C. Rules differ with regard to government lawyers
in a second way. They purport to identify the government lawyer’s
client.195 Rule 1.6(k) states that “[t]he client of the government
lawyer is the agency that employs the lawyer unless expressly
provided to the contrary by appropriate law, regulation, or order.”196
193 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.13 cmt. 9 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2020); MODEL RULES OF
PRO. CONDUCT Scope ¶ 18 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2020). A 2004 opinion by the New York City Bar’s
Professional Ethics Committee construed the Code of Professional Responsibility and offered
an extended analysis of how the conflict rules apply differently to government lawyers and
lawyers for private entities. See N.Y.C. Bar Ass’n Pro. Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 2004-03
(2004) (addressing “conflicts of interest that government lawyers encounter in the exercise of
their official duties in the context of civil litigation”).
194 See 28 C.F.R. § 77.2(a) (“[A]ttorney for the government means the Attorney General.”);
see also supra note 171 and accompanying text (noting that this CFR regulation implements
the McDade Amednment for the Department of Justice).
195 See D.C. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.6(k) (D.C. BAR 2022) (identifying the client as the
government agency).
196 Id. Comment 38 to the Rule explains the reason for the rule:
The term “agency” in paragraph (j) includes, inter alia, executive and
independent departments and agencies, special commissions, committees of
the legislature, agencies of the legislative branch such as the Government
Accountability Office, and the courts to the extent that they employ lawyers
(e.g., staff counsel) to counsel them. The employing agency has been
designated the client under this rule to provide a commonly understood and
easily determinable point for identifying the government client.
Id. r. 1.6 cmt. 38.
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That designation may be sensible for most federal lawyers because
it identifies who in government has the authority to instruct the
lawyer and is consistent with recognizing the United States as the
ultimate client.197 For the Department of Justice, however, it does
not work so well. Literally read, it would make the Justice
Department (i.e., “the agency” that employs the Department’s
lawyers) the client of Department lawyers even when they
represent other agencies of the Executive Branch.198 It would be like
saying that the client of law firm lawyers is their own law firm even
though their work is on behalf of the firm’s clients. It may not affect
the analysis of the responsibilities of a Department lawyer in any
particular situation, but the United States, not the Justice
Department or the Attorney General, is better understood to be the
client of the Justice Department lawyer.199 That view also comports
with Model Rule and Washington, D.C. Rule 1.13, both of which
state that an employed or retained lawyer for an organization
“represents the organization acting through its duly authorized
constituents.”200

VII. HOW PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULES CAN PROTECT
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT LAWYERS FROM A FAITHLESS PRESIDENT
Lawyers answer to two masters: Their clients and the courts
where they are licensed or practice. The rules limit what lawyers
may do for clients no matter how helpful it may be to achieve the
client’s goal.201 Courts have rejected claims that federal or state
court rules cannot bind federal prosecutors.202 Executive power is

197 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.13 cmt. 9 (Am. Bar Ass'n, 2020) (“[T]he
client may be . . . the government as a whole.”).
198 In court, where the United States is a party, Justice Department lawyers appear for the
United States.
199 See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, Who “Owns” Government’s Attorney Client Privilege?,
83 MINN. L. REV. 473, 474 (1998) (arguing that "the United States government possesses, as
a matter of common law, the same attorney-client privilege that exists for a corporation” so
the United States is the client of the Justice Department).
200 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.13(a) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2020); D.C. RULES OF PRO.
CONDUCT r. 1.13(a) (D.C. BAR 2022); see infra text accompanying note 256.
201 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.5 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2020) (noting that
lawyers providing legal services in a jurisdiction are subject to the disciplinary authority of
that jurisdiction, regardless of admission status).
202 See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
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subordinate to the judicial power to regulate the bar.203 Or to put it
starkly, nothing in the Supreme Court’s decisions construing the
President’s take care or other powers permits him to instruct
government lawyers to violate rules of professional conduct,
including to lie to a judge;204 introduce false testimony in a
tribunal;205 prosecute “a charge that the prosecutor knows is not
supported by probable cause;”206 file a frivolous claim;207 or assert
any claim or defense in a civil case, even if not frivolous, “for any
improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or
needlessly increase the cost of litigation.”208 Some of these
prohibitions are also in statutes or procedural rules,209 but they are
all in the rules of professional conduct. The President’s duty to
faithfully execute the laws presupposes the existence of laws.
Professional conduct rules promulgated and enforced by state or
federal courts should be understood to constitute law in that sense.
They come from a branch of government with inherent authority to
regulate the lawyers they license or who appear before them210 and,
for federal courts, a co-equal branch of government.211 They are not
advisory. Violations can have serious legal consequences. It would
203 See, e.g., CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 23 (1986) (“[T]he majority of
American courts have claimed unusual and sometimes sweeping regulatory powers when
dealing with the legal profession.”).
204 See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.3(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (stating that a
lawyer shall not “make a false statement of fact”).
205 See id. (“A lawyer shall not knowingly . . . offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be
false.”).
206 Id. r. 3.8.
207 See id. r. 3.1 (stating that a lawyer shall not bring a proceeding or assert an issue that
is frivolous).
208 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1).
209 Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (creating authority for court to sanction parties for
vexatiously multiplying litigation); Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 42 (1991)
(recognizing that a federal court has inherent fee-shifting authority, even where the conduct
at issue does not come within a statute or court rule providing for sanctions).
210 See J. H. Marshall & Assocs., Inc. v. Burleson, 313 A.2d 587, 591 (D.C. 1973) (“No one
denies that a court has an inherent right to make rules governing the practice of law before
it.”); Shepherd v. Am. Broad. Cos., 62 F.3d 1469, 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“As old as the judiciary
itself, the inherent power enables courts to protect their institutional integrity and to guard
against abuses of the judicial process with contempt citations, fines, awards of attorneys' fees,
and such other orders and sanctions as they find necessary, including even dismissals and
default judgments.”).
211 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (identifying the principle of
“separated powers” and the corresponding “appropriate relationship among the three coequal
Branches”).
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not be the faithful execution of the law for a President to instruct a
government lawyer to violate a court’s procedural rules, evidence
rules, bankruptcy rules, or professional conduct rules. And even if
we assume that a court’s professional conduct rules are not law in
the same way that legislation is law, the McDade Amendment is a
law, and it requires obedience to a jurisdiction's rules.212
Depending on the circumstances, professional conduct rules and
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (among other court
rules) can empower and require Justice Department lawyers to
reject White House efforts to instruct Department lawyers on how
to represent the United States. Under the Supreme Court’s current
view of Article II, nothing can prevent the President in the exercise
of his take care power from removing the Attorney General and
those inferior officers whom the President chooses.213 But can he do
so when his reason is a lawyer’s insistence on compliance with the
law governing lawyers and the rules of professional conduct? This
may not be a realistic question because the President’s motive may
be near impossible to identify. At the least, however, the existence
of these rules and law, and a lawyer’s explicit reliance on them,
should make it politically more difficult to remove her.
A. RULE 1.2(A)

Model Rule 1.2(a) allocates authority for decisions between
lawyers and clients. It provides:
Subject to paragraphs (c) and (d), a lawyer shall abide
by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of
representation and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall
consult with the client as to the means by which they
are to be pursued. A lawyer may take such action on
behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry
out the representation. A lawyer shall abide by a client's
decision whether to settle a matter. In a criminal case,
the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after
212 See 28 U.S.C. § 530B (“An attorney for the Government shall be subject to State laws
and rules, and local Federal court rules . . . .”).
213 See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 163–64 (1926) (holding that Article II
grants to the President the power of appointment and removal of executive officers without
the approval of a legislative body).
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consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered,
whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will
testify.214
When read in conjunction with comment 1, the rule envisions a
division between goals and means, with the client authorized to
identify the goals of a representation and the lawyer authorized to
choose how to achieve them.215 The line between goals and means
will not always be clear, as can be seen in the rule itself. For
example, a criminal defendant’s right to decide whether to testify
and whether to waive a jury trial are means decisions to further the
goal of acquittal, but Rule 1.2(a) gives both decisions to the client,
as does the Sixth Amendment.216
Rule 1.2(a) can help Department lawyers resist improper
political interference. Lawyers are authorized to make many means
decisions, even over a client’s objection, but they are instructed to
“reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the
client’s objectives are to be accomplished.”217 Washington, D.C. Rule
1.2 adds: “A government lawyer’s authority and control over
decisions concerning the representation may, by statute or
regulation, be expanded beyond the limits imposed by [paragraph
(a)].”218
A pending litigation will always have a goal. Rule 1.2(a) gives
lawyers the power to decide how to achieve it. At the trial stage,
that includes their professional judgment of the motions to make,
the witnesses to call, the facts and law to argue, and how to crossMODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
See id. r. 1.2 cmt. 1 (“Paragraph (a) confers upon the client the ultimate authority to
determine the purposes to be served by legal representation, within the limits imposed by
law and the lawyer's professional obligations. The decisions specified in paragraph (a), such
as whether to settle a civil matter, must also be made by the client. See Rule 1.4(a)(1) for the
lawyer's duty to communicate with the client about such decisions. With respect to the means
by which the client's objectives are to be pursued, the lawyer shall consult with the client as
required by Rule 1.4(a)(2) and may take such action as is impliedly authorized to carry out
the representation.”).
216 See McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500, 1509 (2018) (“When a client expressly asserts
that the objective of ‘his defence’ is to maintain innocence of the charged criminal acts, his
lawyer must abide by that objective and may not override it by conceding guilt.”); see also
Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52 (1987) (finding the right to testify to be implicit in the Sixth
Amendment’s compulsory process clause).
217 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.4(a)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
218 D.C. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (D.C. BAR 2022).
214
215
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examine adverse witnesses. At the appellate stage, it includes the
arguments to make or exclude.219 These are not among the decisions
that may attract political interference. Harder questions are how
the rule operates when deciding (1) whether to file a case in the first
place; (2) what settlements to offer and accept in civil cases; and (3)
what pleas to offer or sentencing recommendations to make in
criminal cases. In public or private civil litigation, the decisions in
(1) and (2) belong to the client.220 By analogy to civil settlement
authority, the decisions in (3) should also be for the client because
they ask how the dispute should be resolved. Of course, the
President ordinarily leaves these decisions to the Justice
Department.221
Decisions on what legal arguments to make in a particular case
would initially appear to belong to the Department because they are
decisions about how to achieve a goal, not what the goal is.222 But
that is not so clear. Consider an argument to the Supreme Court on
the meaning of the Due Process Clause or the Sherman Act. Choices
must be made from among two or three plausible positions. (If the
United States is not a party, it must decide whether to intervene
and the arguments to make if it does.) A President’s claim of
authority to make these decisions is strong. The President may be
content to leave the decision to the Solicitor General, but perhaps
the President is a lawyer, maybe even a former law professor who

See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (“[B]y promulgating a per se rule that the
client, not the professional advocate, must be allowed to decide what issues are to be pressed,
the Court of Appeals seriously undermines the ability of counsel to present the client's case
in accord with counsel's professional evaluation.”).
220 See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (mandating that the
lawyer abides by the client's decisions regarding the objectives of the representation,
including whether to settle).
221 See Patrick E. Longan & James P. Fleissner, Partisanship and the Attorney General of
the United States: Timely Lessons from Edward Levi and Griffin Bell about Repairing a
Politicized Department of Justice, 72 MERCER L. REV. 731, 745–46 (2021) (discussing different
presidential administrations' views on the independence of the Department of Justice from
White House).
222 See, e.g., Robert Burns & Steven Lubet, Ethics 2000 and Beyond Reform or Professional
Responsibility as Usual?: Division of Authority Between Attorney and Client: The Case of the
Benevolent Otolaryngologist, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1275, 1290 (“[I]n practice, the most salient
aspect of Rule 1.2 itself is the contrast between objectives, where the professional is obligated
to ‘abide by’ the client's decision, and means, whereas there is only a requirement that the
professional ‘consult’ with the layman. Most professionals would draw the conclusion that the
ultimate decision as to means is theirs.”).
219
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taught the very issue. He may want the Solicitor General to make
a particular argument about what the Due Process Clause requires
in one case because he thinks it will be in the best interest of the
United States in future cases. Maybe he wants to argue the case
himself. The President may view the Department’s position on the
meaning of a law, the Constitution, or precedent as one additional
way in which the law can be faithfully executed.
The same dynamic could emerge in private litigation. In a
commercial case, a corporate litigant may be thinking about the
long-term consequences of a particular interpretation of copyright,
antitrust, or securities law. It may want its counsel to argue for the
narrowest construction that is most likely to succeed, or,
anticipating the reappearance of the issue, it may want counsel to
argue for the broadest construction even if a narrower one may have
a better chance to prevail. The resolution of these questions should
be for the client because the decision partakes of both means—how
to prevail in the particular matter—and goals—the creation of
precedent favorable to the organization’s commercial interests.
More broadly, the claim may be made that because “all” executive
authority resides in the President,223 and because civil and criminal
litigation brought in the name of the United States is an exercise of
executive authority,224 the President is empowered to make not only
the decisions in (1), (2), and (3) above, if he chooses, but also to make
or countermand every decision that arises in the work of the Justice
Department, no matter how trivial. In other words, the President’s
take care duty may be seen to override the allocation of decision
making in Rule 1.2(a) or elsewhere, including in the law of agency
and fiduciary duty, and without regard to the effect on the rule of
law and the value of consistency in its application. That would mean
that the President can instruct the Department not to investigate,
sue, or indict a particular person or company regardless of the
strength of the evidence of culpability and even if Department
policies dictate the opposite; conversely, it would mean that the

See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text.
See United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 190 (5th Cir. 1965) (Wisdom, J., concurring)
(“The prosecution of offenses against the United States is an executive function within the
exclusive prerogative of the Attorney General.”); see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691
(1988) (“There is no real dispute that the functions performed by the independent counsel are
'executive' in the sense that they are law enforcement functions that typically have been
undertaken by officials within the Executive Branch.”).
223
224

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol57/iss1/4

48

Gillers: Because They Are Lawyers First

2022]

BECAUSE THEY ARE LAWYERS FIRST

211

President can instruct the Department to investigate, sue, or indict
a particular person, in contravention of Department policies, so long
as the facts and law can support the decision; and that the President
can decide the terms for any civil settlement, plea bargain, or
sentencing recommendation even if they contravene Department
policies. The President’s motive, in this expansive view, would be
irrelevant as long as his instruction was not unlawful or based on
“race, religion, or other arbitrary classification, including the
exercise of protected statutory and constitutional rights.”225 The
only check on this power would be the political cost of invoking it
and possibly a Department official’s refusal to comply, choosing
instead to quit or be fired.
Scholars have asked, however, whether there is some
constitutionally grounded doctrine that would restrict the
President’s take care authority over the Justice Department’s
decisions solely to questions of resource allocation, such as a
direction to focus on environmental violations or white collar crime,
and to exclude presidential authority to instruct the Department on
decisions in specific matters.226 Answers may focus on history and
norms and the word “faithfully” in Article II, while recognizing the
absence of a primary legal authority.227 While various efforts to give
content to the requirement that the President “faithfully” execute
the law may or may not be persuasive, the word must have some
meaning because the Court has told us that every word in the
Constitution does228 and because the framers believed that
225 Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985); see also United States v. Goodwin,
457 U.S. 368, 381 (1982) (illustrating that due process would be violated if a charge results
from prosecutorial vindictiveness).
226 See, e.g., Andrew Kent, Ethan J. Leib & Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Faithful
Execution and Article II, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2111, 2119 (2019) (proposing a fiduciary theory
of Article II). But see Samuel L. Bray & Paul B. Miller, Against Fiduciary Constitutionalism,
106 VA. L. REV. 1479, 1479 (2020) (critiquing suggestions of fiduciary status deriving from
the Constitution).
227 See, e.g., Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, May Federal Prosecutors Take Direction
from the President?, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1817, 1832 (2019) (“Traditionally, the president's
role in executing criminal law has been limited to setting criminal justice policy and hiring
and firing the Attorney General and other high-ranking prosecutors, and so there is no settled
understanding of what it means for the president to faithfully execute the criminal law in
making decisions in individual criminal cases.”).
228 See Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 572–73 (1933) (“In expounding the
Constitution of the United States, every word must have its due force, and appropriate
meaning; for it is evident from the whole instrument, that no word was unnecessarily used,
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“faithfully” was a limitation on the exercise of power.229 It would not,
for example, be the faithful execution of the law to use executive
power in order to enrich a President’s friends and relatives or to
violate the law.230
I approach these questions not from the perspective of a legal
historian seeking to identify the most likely meaning of “faithfully,”
but rather from the perspective of the professional responsibility of
Justice Department lawyers whose client is the United States.
Department lawyers have a professional duty to ask, when
circumstances warrant, whether an instruction from the President
(or anyone else in the Executive Branch) constitutes the faithful
or needlessly added. The many discussions which have taken place upon the construction of
the constitution, have proved the correctness of this proposition; and shown the high talent,
the caution, and the foresight of the illustrious men who framed it. Every word appears to
have been weighed with the utmost deliberation, and its force and effect to have been fully
understood.”).
229 “Oaths of office in general were discussed as real and meaningful checks on official
behavior by figures such as Hamilton in a Federalist essay, the influential essayist ‘Brutus’
(likely Melancton Smith), and others. There was some, but not much, dissent from that
theme. And ‘no objection [was] made,’ Hamilton wrote in another Federalist essay, ‘nor could
[it] possibly admit of any,’ to the requirement that the President faithfully execute the laws.”
Kent et al., supra note 226, at 2130 (footnotes omitted).
230 Professor Kent and his co-authors write:
Our history supports three core original meanings of the Constitution's
commands of faithful execution. First, the Faithful Execution Clauses clarify
how important it was to constitutional designers that the President stay
within his authorizations and not act ultra vires. This meaning of the clauses
may have implications for the relationship between the Executive and the
legislature. Second, the President is constitutionally prohibited from using
his office to profit himself and engage in financial transactions that primarily
benefit himself. Although the Compensation Clause and the Emoluments
Clause in Article II (as well as the Foreign Emoluments Clause for all officers
in Article I) can be said to reinforce this intuitive conclusion, the history of
the language of faithful execution suggests this reading, too. The faithful
execution requirement in the Presidential Oath Clause, which appears right
after the Compensation and Emoluments Clauses, may be seen, perhaps, as
a belt-and-suspenders effort to help police conflicts of interests and proscribe
self-dealing. More generally, faithful execution demands that the President
act for reasons associated primarily with the public interest rather than his
self-interest. Third, the Faithful Execution Clauses reinforce that the
President must act diligently and in good faith, taking affirmative steps to
pursue what is in the best interest of his national constituency. Whereas the
prohibitions on self-dealing sound in proscription, the command of diligence,
care, and good faith contain an affirmative, prescriptive component.
Id. at 2178–79 (footnotes omitted).
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execution of the laws because if it does not, they cannot obey it.
Sometimes it may depend on motive and require lawyers to ask the
reasons for the instruction. At the same time, Department lawyers
must recognize the breadth of executive authority and ordinarily
assume, in the first instance, that an instruction is the faithful
execution of the laws regardless of their views of its wisdom. This
conclusion accords with Model Rule 1.13, which describes the duties
of lawyers who represent an organization, expressly including
government organizations, when they learn of misconduct by the
organization’s constituents.231
B. RULE 1.2(D)

Rule 1.2(d) forbids a lawyer to “assist a client, in conduct the
lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent.”232 Rule 1.2(d) can help
Department lawyers resist improper political interference. By
definition, an instruction from an executive official, including the
President, to commit a crime or fraud is not the faithful execution
of the laws but the opposite. Rule 1.2(d) limits what lawyers may do
only if they know that the client’s conduct is criminal or fraudulent,
and “knows” is defined to mean “actual knowledge,” including
knowledge that “may be inferred from the circumstances.”233 But a
“lawyer who has knowledge of facts that create a high probability
that a client is seeking the lawyer's services in a transaction to
further criminal or fraudulent activity has a duty to inquire further
to avoid assisting that activity under Rule 1.2(d). Failure to make a
reasonable inquiry is willful blindness punishable under the actual
knowledge standard of the Rule.”234

See infra text accompanying notes 255–260 (introducing Rule 1.13).
MODEL RULE OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020); see also D.C. RULE OF
PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.2(e) (D.C. BAR 2022) (containing a rule comparable to Model Rule 1.2(d)).
233 MODEL RULE OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.0(f) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
234 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 20-491 (2020).
231
232
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C. RULE 1.6(B)

Rule 1.6(b) describes seven settings in which a lawyer has the
authority to disclose a client’s confidential information.235 Three
could apply to government lawyers in the circumstances described
in this Article. The first permits disclosure of confidences to
“prevent” a client’s “crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to
result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of
another.”236 The second permits disclosure to “prevent, mitigate, or
rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or property of
another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted” from a
client’s crime or fraud.237 In either instance, the client must have
“used the lawyer’s services,” unbeknownst (one hopes) to the lawyer,
to further the crime or fraud.238 The Washington, D.C. Rules have
parallel provisions.239 A third exception to a lawyer’s duty to
maintain confidentiality (in the Model Rules) permits disclosure to
“comply with other law or a court order”240 and (in the D.C. Rules)
“when . . . required by law or court order.”241 The D.C. Rules also
authorize disclosure by “a government lawyer when permitted or
authorized by law.”242 For each exception, the lawyer must
“reasonably believe” that disclosure is necessary.243 The Model
Rules and the Washington, D.C. Rules have the same definition of
fraud: “‘Fraud’ or ‘fraudulent’ denotes conduct that is fraudulent

235 See MODEL RULE OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.6(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (noting that all the
situations listed require the lawyer to disclose only to the extent deemed “reasonably
necessary”).
236 Id. r. 1.6(b)(2).
237 Id. r. 1.6(b)(3).
238 Id. r. 1.6(b)(2)–(3).
239 See D.C. RULE OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.6(d) (D.C. BAR 2022) (“When a client has used or
is using a lawyer’s services to further a crime or fraud, the lawyer may reveal client
confidences and secrets, to the extent reasonably necessary . . . .”). Washington, D.C.’s rules
differ in another way. They distinguish between “confidences” and “secrets.” “Confidences”
are protected by the attorney-client privilege. “Secrets” refers to information a lawyer learns
in representing the client from persons who are not clients. Id. r. 1.6(b).
240 MODEL RULE OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(6) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
241 D.C. RULE OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.6(e)(2)(A) (D.C. BAR 2022).
242 Id. r. 1.6(e)(2)(B).
243 MODEL RULE OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.6(b) (AM. BAR. ASS'N 2020) (requiring the lawyer to
disclose only to the extent “reasonably necessary”).
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under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable
jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive.”244
1. How Rule 1.6(b) Can or Cannot Empower Justice Department
Lawyers to Resist Improper Political Interference. It may be unlikely
that a Department lawyer will discover that an Executive Branch
officer or employee has committed, is committing, or is about to
commit a fraud or crime, but it is possible, including under the broad
federal obstruction of justice statutes.245 This is perhaps most likely
to transpire in connection with a litigation, a grand jury proceeding,
or an investigation. (If the matter is before a tribunal, the more
demanding disclosure requirements of Model Rule 3.3 may
apply.246) Wherever the crime or fraud occurs or is threatened, the
government lawyer cannot assist it but must instead prevent it or
its consequences.
The Model Rule exception permitting disclosure to “comply with
other law”247 (or its D.C. equivalent) means that Congress can
expand the confidentiality exceptions by requiring disclosure of
probable criminal or fraudulent conduct, perhaps to the chairs and
ranking members of the Senate and House judiciary committees.
While the Rule 1.6(b) exceptions are permissive only,248 Congress
can convert them to mandatory disclosure exceptions through
legislation. Congress can also require a federal lawyer to take
designated action with a state of mind short of actual knowledge, as
is now required.
2. The Related Issue of the Attorney-Client Privilege for
Communications Between Executive Branch Officers or Employees
and Executive Branch Lawyers. The federal attorney-client
privilege is statutorily (if implicitly) recognized in Rule 501 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence.249 While Model Rule 1.6(a) forbids a
Id. r. 1.0(d); D.C. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.0(d) (D.C. BAR 2022).
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1512, 1519 (describing an extensive range of conduct as
obstruction violations).
246 Rule 3.3 requires a lawyer to “take reasonable remedial measures,” possibly including
disclosure of a client’s confidential information, to correct false statements to a tribunal by
the lawyer or a lawyer’s witness. See infra text accompanying notes 296–302.
247 MODEL RULE OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.6(b)(6) (AM. BAR ASS'N 2020).
248 See id. (using the permissive word “may” regarding when it is appropriate to “reveal
information relating to the representation of a client”).
249 “The common law—as interpreted by United States courts in the light of reason and
experience—governs a claim of privilege unless any of the following provides otherwise: the
244
245
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lawyer to reveal certain information learned in representing a
client, regardless of the source, the privilege entitles the lawyer and
client to refuse to disclose communications between them, a refusal
that might otherwise constitute contempt.250
When a federal grand jury sought communications between the
President and a witness who was Deputy White House Counsel, the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the witness’s
assertion of privilege.251 For this conclusion, it relied on Rule 501,
holding as matter of statutory construction that:
[I]t would be contrary to tradition, common
understanding, and our governmental system for the
attorney-client privilege to attach to White House
Counsel in the same manner as private counsel. When
government attorneys learn, through communications
with their clients, of information related to criminal
misconduct, they may not rely on the government
attorney-client privilege to shield such information
from disclosure to a grand jury.252
We don’t know whether the Supreme Court would read Rule 501
the same way if the subpoena were from a congressional committee
United States Constitution; a federal statute; or rules prescribed by the Supreme Court.” FED.
R. EVID. 501.
250 The difference is recognized in comment 3 to Rule 1.6:
The principle of client-lawyer confidentiality is given effect by related
bodies of law: the attorney-client privilege, the work product doctrine and
the rule of confidentiality established in professional ethics. The attorneyclient privilege and work product doctrine apply in judicial and other
proceedings in which a lawyer may be called as a witness or otherwise
required to produce evidence concerning a client. The rule of client-lawyer
confidentiality applies in situations other than those where evidence is
sought from the lawyer through compulsion of law. The confidentiality rule,
for example, applies not only to matters communicated in confidence by the
client but also to all information relating to the representation, whatever its
source. A lawyer may not disclose such information except as authorized or
required by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.6 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
251 In re Lindsey, 148 F.3d 1100, 1118 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (distinguishing between the personal
attorney-client privilege and the government attorney-client privilege).
252 Id. at 1114; accord In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 925–26 (8th
Cir. 1997) (holding that neither the attorney-client privilege nor the work product doctrine
applied to the White House when served with a grand jury subpoena).
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rather than a grand jury and the communications were otherwise
privileged. But Congress can achieve the same result through
legislation. It can amend the federal evidence rules to narrow the
attorney-client privilege for communications between officers and
employees of the Executive Branch and a Department lawyer. Just
as the Deputy White House Counsel could not assert privilege
before a federal grand jury,253 Congress can, on a proper evidentiary
showing it defines, amend Rule 501 to prevent the assertion of
privilege when a government lawyer is subpoenaed to testify in
Congress, while preserving the privilege for the same
communications in private litigation.254
D. RULE 1.13

Rule 1.13 addresses lawyers for organizations, most obviously
corporations, but both the Model Rules and Washington, D.C. Rules
also include “governmental organizations.”255 They both identify the
organization itself as the client.256 They both provide that, “A lawyer
employed or retained by an organization represents the
organization acting through its duly authorized constituents.”257
Model Rule 1.13(b) mandates “reporting up” to others within the
organization in two circumstances:
Lindsey, 148 F.3d at 1114.
Former Justice Department officer Jeffrey Clark refused to answer questions from the
January 6 committee in the House, citing attorney-client privilege for his communications
with the President. See Luke Broadwater, Trump Justice Dept. Official Refuses to Answer
Jan.
6
House
Panel’s
Question,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
5,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/05/us/politics/jeffrey-clark-capitol-riot-committee.html.
Jeffrey Clark’s claim is dubious but an amendment to Rule 501 could defeat it even if it had
merit.
255 See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.13 cmt. 9 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (“The duty
defined in this Rule applies to governmental organizations.”); D.C. RULE OF PRO. CONDUCT r.
1.13 cmt. 8 (D.C. BAR 2022) (“The duty defined in this rule encompasses the representation
of governmental organizations.”).
256 See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.13(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (“A lawyer
employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting through its duly
authorized constituents.”); D.C. RULE OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.13(a) (D.C. BAR 2022) (same).
For the government lawyer, this usually requires identifying the part of government that is
the client, but for Justice Department lawyers, the client should be construed as the United
States. See supra text accompanying notes 196–200 (describing how each rule identifies each
client).
257 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.13(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020); D.C. RULE OF PRO.
CONDUCT r. 1.13(a) (D.C. BAR 2022).
253
254
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If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer,
employee or other person associated with the
organization is engaged in action, intends to act or
refuses to act in a matter related to the representation
that is a violation of a legal obligation to the
organization, or a violation of law that reasonably might
be imputed to the organization, and that is likely to
result in substantial injury to the organization, then the
lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the
best interest of the organization. Unless the lawyer
reasonably believes that it is not necessary in the best
interest of the organization to do so, the lawyer shall
refer the matter to higher authority in the organization,
including, if warranted by the circumstances to the
highest authority that can act on behalf of the
organization as determined by applicable law.258
This duty requires the organization’s lawyer to identify the “higher”
and “highest” authorities, “as determined by applicable law.”259
Washington, D.C.’s Rule 1.13(b) is substantively the same as Model
Rule 1.13(b).260
The Model Rules (but not the Washington, D.C. Rules) then
authorize disclosure of certain confidential information to persons
outside the organization, known as “reporting out.”261 Here we have
another permissive exception to confidentiality under Rule 1.6. It
applies if:
(1) despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with
paragraph (b) the highest authority that can act on
behalf of the organization insists upon or fails to
address in a timely and appropriate manner an action,
or a refusal to act, that is clearly a violation of law, and
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.13(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (emphasis added).
Id.
260 See D.C. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.13(b) (D.C. BAR 2022) (using language nearly
identical to the Model Rules language).
261 The duty to disclose outside of the organization outlined in Model Rule 1.13(c) and
limited by 1.13(d) has been discussed by commentators as a “reporting out” responsibility.
See William H. Simon, Duties to Organizational Clients, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 489, 502
(2016) (examining the interconnected rules governing disclosure in the “reporting-out”
context).
258
259
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(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the violation is
reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the
organization, then the lawyer may reveal information
relating to the representation whether or not Rule 1.6
permits such disclosure, but only if and to the extent the
lawyer reasonably believes necessary to prevent
substantial injury to the organization.262
1. How Rule 1.13 Can or Cannot Empower Justice Department
Lawyers to Resist Improper Political Interference. The Rule
recognizes the government as an organization within the scope of
the rule’s requirements and authorities.263 This makes the United
States, not any individual constituent of the federal government,
the client. D.C. Rule 1.6 says that the client of government lawyers
is the agency for which they work.264 As noted above, while this may
make sense for other agencies, it does not make sense for the Justice
Department. Applied literally, it would mean that the client of
Justice Department lawyers is the Justice Department itself,
essentially their own law firm.265
Beyond identifying the client, the Rule’s mandatory reporting up
obligation should ensure that upper echelon lawyers in the
Department, which could include the Attorney General and inferior
officers, will learn of constituent conduct described in Model Rule
1.13(b).266 Such conduct would include the faithless execution of the
laws by Executive Department personnel, which would be “a
violation of a legal obligation to” the United States.267 All of this can
and should be made clear to employees and officers within the
Executive Department. They are constituents of the client whose
conduct may create a duty to report up.
In jurisdictions that follow the Model Rules, conduct described in
Rule 1.13(c) can be disclosed outside the Department, including to
the chairs and ranking members of the judiciary committees of

MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.13(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
264 D.C. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.6 cmt. 38 (D.C. BAR 2022).
265 See supra notes 196–200 and accompanying text.
266 See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.13 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (defining the lawyer’s
responsibility as, first, to report up to persons higher within the organization, with authority
to report out only if the organization “fails to address” the matter or “refuses to act”).
267 Id. r. 1.13(b).
262
263
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Congress.268 For paragraph (c) to apply, however, the act must
“clearly [be] a violation of law” that the lawyer “reasonably believes
. . . is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the
organization.”269 Rule 1.13 does not require that the “injury” be
monetary. The word can encompass the government’s need for
confidence in the administration of justice and the lawful operation
of the government’s business.
In fact, disclosure to Congress may also be within the reporting
up duty, which is broader than the reporting out authority, as well
as mandatory, if Congress is viewed as “the highest authority that
can act on behalf of the organization [the United States] as
determined by applicable law,” at least within the meaning of Rule
1.13(b). The applicable law can be one Congress can pass specifically
for this purpose. Congress “act[s] on behalf of” the United States
whenever it legislates or otherwise exercises its Article I powers.
2. The Interplay Between Rule 1.13 and the Take Care Clause.
The President must take care to execute the laws “faithfully.”270
“Faithfully” also appears in the oath the Constitution requires the
President to take.271 The adverb must have some meaning.272 It is a
word of limitation.273 The President cannot execute the laws
faithlessly. A faithless act or order violates the Constitution.274
Imagine that in early January 2021, with no factual basis, the
President directed the Attorney General to issue a finding of fraud
in the presidential elections in Arizona, Pennsylvania, and Georgia
and to file lawsuits invalidating the results in the name of the
United States.275 The Attorney General could have refused and
resigned, of course, but could he have refused and not resigned? If
so, could the President then have fired him and appointed a more
See id. r. 1.13(c) (outlining the disclosure permitted if reporting up fails).
Id.
270 See supra text accompanying note 12.
271 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (requiring the President to take this oath before taking
office: “I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of
the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the
Constitution of the United States”).
272 See supra text accompanying note 228.
273 See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
274 See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Faithless Execution, 133 HARV. L. REV. F. 94, 96
(2020) (“[T]o actually support the Constitution is to support it faithfully.”).
275 There was an effort by a Department lawyer in this direction. See Benner & Savage,
supra note 23 (discussing former President Trump’s efforts to pressure the Attorney General
to alter election outcomes).
268
269
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compliant Attorney General? The Supreme Court has told us that
the President must have the power to remove a principal officer to
protect his constitutional duty to faithfully execute the law and to
honor democratic principles.276 The President, not his subordinates,
is chosen by the people. The President cannot be saddled with
officials that, as he sees it, frustrate the policies he was elected to
pursue or in whom he lacks confidence.277 But that justification
disappears if the reason for an official’s removal is a refusal to
violate the Constitution or otherwise act unlawfully, or if the refusal
is required by the official’s own oath “to support this
Constitution,”278 which in turn requires that officials take a stand
on what is and is not the faithful execution of the laws.
Model Rule 1.13 should be amended to specifically address
government lawyers. While Rule 1.13 does apply to government
lawyers,279 and comment 9 to Model Rule 1.13 (but not the
Washington, D.C. Rule) does say that “a government lawyer may
have authority under applicable law to question” a government
official’s “conduct more extensively than” does a lawyer for a private
organization,280 it would be beneficial to amend Rule 1.13(b) to
clarify and expand the government lawyer’s duty under the rule.
Worthy of consideration is a distinct rule for government lawyers
rather than including them in a rule for all organizational lawyers.
The reporting up obligation should arise if a government lawyer has
“a reasonable basis to believe” that a violation has occurred even if

276 See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 163–64 (1926) (“Our conclusion on the merits,
sustained by the arguments before stated, is that article 2 grants to the President the
executive power of the government—i.e., the general administrative control of those
executing the laws, including the power of appointment and removal of executive officers—a
conclusion confirmed by his obligation to take care that the laws be faithfully executed . . . .”);
see also supra text accompanying note 69.
277 See supra text accompanying note 120.
278 Article VI clause 3 of the United States Constitution provides:
The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of
the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both
of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or
Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be
required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United
States.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
279 See supra notes 255–256 and accompanying text.
280 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.13 cmt. 9 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
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the lawyer lacks actual knowledge that it occurred.281 Furthermore,
the requirement that the conduct be “in a matter related to the
representation” should be deleted. Government lawyers should be
required to report up if the Rule’s requirements are present even if
the misconduct of which they become aware is not related to their
representation. Because Rule 1.13(c) (reporting out) builds on Rule
1.13(b) (reporting up), changes to Rule 1.13(b) will also affect Rule
1.13(c). Legislation could create the same authorities and
obligations for government lawyers. The advantage of legislation is
that it would apply uniformly to government lawyers nationwide
whereas Model Rule 1.13 varies among American jurisdictions.282
A freestanding rule for government lawyers, drawing on Rule
1.13, might read as follows:
Rule 1.13A: Government Lawyers
(a) Unless otherwise provided by law, a lawyer
employed or retained by [the government] [a
government entity]283 an organization represents the
government organization acting through its duly
authorized constituents.
(b) If a lawyer for the government an organization
knows has a reasonable basis to believe that an
officer, employee or other person associated with the
organization government is engaged in action, intends
to act or refuses to act in a matter related to the
representation that is a violation of a legal obligation to
the government organization, or a violation of law that
reasonably might be imputed to the organization, and
that is likely to result in substantial injury to the
government organization, then, pending such
investigation as is appropriate, the lawyer shall
281 “Knows” under Model Rule 1.13(b) means “actual knowledge” as defined in Model Rule
1.0. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
282 See Judith A McMorrow, The (F)Utility of Rules: Regulating Attorney Conduct in Federal
Court Practice, 58 SMU L. REV. 3, 8 (2005) (“The state rules of professional conduct were
crafted by state supreme courts for regulatory use, using the model version proposed by the
ABA as a starting point for discussion, and apply to a wide range of settings.”).
283 These options are presented in the alternative. For simplicity, the draft uses
“government” to refer to both.
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refuse to assist the officer or employee and
explain the lawyer’s reason to the officer or
employee. If the officer or employee does not
desist, the lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably
necessary in the best interest of the government
organization. Unless the lawyer reasonably believes
that it is not necessary in the best interest of the
organization government to do so, the lawyer shall
refer the matter to higher authority in the government
organization, including, if warranted by the
circumstances to the highest authority that can act on
behalf of the government organization as determined
by applicable law. “Injury” in paragraph (b) and (c)
of this rule includes the government’s interest in
public confidence in its work.
(c) Except as provided in paragraph (d),284 if
(1) despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with
paragraph (b) the highest authority that can act on
behalf of the government organization insists upon or
fails to address in a timely and appropriate manner an
action, or a refusal to act, that is clearly a violation of
law, and
(2) the lawyer reasonably believes that the violation is
reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the
government organization, then the lawyer may reveal
information relating to the representation [to
_________]285 whether or not Rule 1.6 permits such
disclosure, but only if and to the extent the lawyer
Paragraph (d) provides:
Paragraph (c) shall not apply with respect to information relating to a
lawyer's representation of an organization to investigate an alleged violation
of law, or to defend the organization or an officer, employee or other
constituent associated with the organization against a claim arising out of
an alleged violation of law.
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.13(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
285 Identity of those to whom disclosure may be made will depend on the identity of the
government client. An obvious choice for federal lawyers will be the chairs and ranking
members of the judiciary (or equivalent) committee of each House of Congress.
284
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reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial
injury to the government organization.
This text deviates only modestly from what Rule 1.13 now
requires of government lawyers. The obligations it imposes, like
those that Rule 1.13 now imposes, do not interfere with the
President’s faithful execution of the laws, as defined by the Supreme
Court, but rather protects it.
E. RULE 1.16

Rule 1.16 tells lawyers when they may or must withdraw from a
representation and how to do so.286 The Model Rules and D.C. Rules
both require withdrawal if “the representation will result in
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.”287 Both
permit withdrawal “if withdrawal can be accomplished without
material adverse effect on the interests of the client.”288
A lawyer may also withdraw under the Model Rules if:
(2) the client persists in a course of action involving the
lawyer's services that the lawyer reasonably believes is
criminal or fraudulent;
(3) the client has used the lawyer's services to
perpetrate a crime or fraud; [or]
(4) the client insists upon taking action that the lawyer
considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has a
fundamental disagreement.289
The Washington, D.C. Rules contain paragraphs (2) and (3) but
omit paragraph (4).290 In all circumstances, the lawyer must comply

See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.16 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (identifying
mandatory and permissive withdrawal).
287 Id. at 1.16(a)(1); D.C. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.16(a)(1) (D.C. BAR 2022).
288 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.16(b)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020); D.C. RULES OF PRO.
CONDUCT r. 1.16(b) (D.C. BAR 2022).
289 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.16(b)(2)–(4) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
290 D.C. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.16(b)(1)–(2) (D.C. BAR 2022).
286
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with the withdrawal provisions of a tribunal in which the lawyer
has appeared.291
Under one or another of these provisions, a Department lawyer
may withdraw from a matter even if an attempted White House
intervention is lawful. They will be required to withdraw from the
particular matter if continued representation would violate a
professional conduct rule or is unlawful.292 In court, the withdrawal
will ordinarily appear on the public docket, though not necessarily
the reason for withdrawal.293 But the judge may insist on disclosure
of the reason if it is not privileged and can choose to make it
public.294 Here again is where the character of the Department’s
lawyers is key.295 A willingness to withdraw from a matter or resign
may deter the President from insisting on compliance with his
instruction. President Trump reportedly backed away from
replacing acting Attorney General Jeffrey Rosen with acting
Assistant Attorney General Jeffrey Clark after Trump was told that
doing so would lead to mass resignations at the Justice
Department.296 Even with no disclosure of the reasons, that threat
should inhibit attempts to replace the Department’s leadership with
more compliant lawyers.
F. RULE 3.3

Rule 3.3 of both the Model Rules and the Washington, D.C. Rules
forbids lawyers to make false statements to a tribunal.297 If they do

291 See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.16(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (“A lawyer must
comply with applicable law requiring notice to or permission of a tribunal when terminating
a representation. When ordered to do so by a tribunal, a lawyer shall continue representation
notwithstanding good cause for terminating the representation.”); D.C. RULES OF PRO.
CONDUCT r. 1.16(c) (D.C. BAR 2022) (containing identical language).
292 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.16(a)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
293 See id. r. 1.16 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (“The court may request an explanation for
the withdrawal, while the lawyer may be bound to keep confidential the facts that would
constitute such an explanation. The lawyer's statement that professional considerations
require termination of the representation ordinarily should be accepted as sufficient.”).
294 Id.
295 See supra text accompanying note 127.
296 See Benner & Savage, supra note 23 (reporting on the effect of impending resignations
on the President’s potentially unlawful action).
297 See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(1) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (“A lawyer shall
not knowingly . . . make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal . . . .”); D.C. RULES OF
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so unintentionally and later come to know of the falsity, they have
a duty to correct what they said.298 The Model Rules require
correction even if doing so will disclose a client’s confidential
information.299 The Model Rules (but not the Washington, D.C.
Rules) also require remedial measures, including if necessary
through disclosure of confidential information, where lawyers know
that their own witness, including their client, has testified falsely,
even if not knowingly falsely.300 Both the Model Rules and the
Washington, D.C. Rules permit a lawyer to refuse to introduce
testimony (other than testimony of a criminal defendant) that the
lawyer reasonably believes is false.301 Tribunal is a defined term. It
can include legislative bodies and agencies.302
It may be unlikely that the White House would seek to interfere
with trial decisions in a pending matter, but Rule 3.3 (along with
PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(1) (D.C. BAR 2022) (“A lawyer shall not knowingly . . . [m]ake a false
statement of fact or law to a tribunal . . . .”).
298 See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(3) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (“If a lawyer . . .
has offered material evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall
take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal.”); D.C.
RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.3 cmt. 2 (D.C. BAR 2022) (“If the lawyer comes to know that a
statement of material fact or law that the lawyer previously made to the tribunal is false, the
lawyer has a duty to correct the statement, unless correction would require disclosure of
information that is prohibited by Rule 1.6.”).
299 See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(3) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (“If a lawyer, the
lawyer’s client, or a witness called by the lawyer, has offered material evidence and the lawyer
comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures, including,
if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal.”).
300 Id.
301 See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.3(a)(3) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (“A lawyer may
refuse to offer evidence, other than the testimony of a defendant in a criminal matter, that
the lawyer reasonably believes is false.”); D.C. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT, r. 3.3(a)(4) (D.C. BAR
2022) (“A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence, other than the testimony of a defendant in a
criminal matter, that the lawyer reasonably believes is false.”). In criminal cases, the accused
has a constitutional right to testify over his lawyer’s advice but not to commit perjury. See
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971) (holding that a criminal defendant may elect to
testify or not to testify but has no constitutional right to commit perjury).
302 See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.0(m) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (“‘Tribunal’ denotes
a court, an arbitrator in a binding arbitration proceeding or a legislative body, administrative
agency or other body acting in an adjudicative capacity. A legislative body, administrative
agency or other body acts in an adjudicative capacity when a neutral official, after the
presentation of evidence or legal argument by a party or parties, will render a binding legal
judgment directly affecting a party's interests in a particular matter.”); D.C. RULES OF PRO.
CONDUCT, r. 1.0(n) (D.C. BAR, 2022) (defining “[t]ribunal” in similar terms to the Model
Rules).
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Rule 1.2(a))303 offers some protection if it does. Under both the
Model Rules and the Washington, D.C. Rules, a Justice Department
lawyer will be in charge of what information is introduced in court.
Under the Model Rules, lawyers may have to correct the false (not
necessarily perjurious) testimony of their witnesses even if doing so
requires disclosure of confidential information.304 In Washington,
D.C., the lawyer’s correction may not include disclosure of client
confidences as defined in its rules.305
G. RULE 3.8(A)

Model Rule 3.8(a) requires prosecutors to “refrain from
prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by
probable cause.”306 Washington, D.C. Rule 3.8(c) is more demanding
of prosecutors in several ways.307 It forbids prosecuting the case “to
trial” if a “prosecutor knows” that the evidence is not “sufficient to
establish a prima facie showing of guilt.”308 This means that even if
there was probable cause to file the charge, the trial evidence must
also support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.309

See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (noting that some
decisions, like whether to settle and whether to plea, are ultimately up to the client).
304 See id. r. 3.3(a)(3) (specifying that reasonable remedial measures may require disclosure
to the tribunal).
305 See D.C. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.3 cmt. 2 (D.C. BAR 2022) (clarifying that the
Washington, D.C. disclosure rule differs from the Model Rules).
306 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.8(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
307 See D.C. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3.8 (D.C. BAR 2022). This Rule provides in part:
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall not:
(a) In exercising discretion to investigate or to prosecute, improperly favor
or
invidiously
discriminate
against
any
person;
(b) File in court or maintain a charge that the prosecutor knows is not
supported
by
probable
cause;
(c) Prosecute to trial a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by
evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie showing of guilt;
(d) Intentionally avoid pursuit of evidence or information because it may
damage the prosecution’s case or aid the defense.
Id. r. 3.8(a)–(d).
308 Id. r. 3.8(c).
309 For federal criminal trials that occur outside the District of Columbia, the local court
equivalent to this rule would govern. See supra Part V (discussing how Department of Justice
lawyers are subject to the court imposed professional conduct rules of jurisdictions where
their conduct occurred).
303
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These rules give prosecutors an unambiguous duty that
empowers them to reject White House efforts to instigate or
maintain politically motivated prosecutions that violate the rule’s
conditions.
H. RULE 5.1

Model Rule 5.1 describes the duties of lawyers “having direct
supervisory authority over” other lawyers.310 A difference between
the Model Rule and the D.C. version is the addition of “government
agency” in the latter.311 Rule 1.0(c) of the Washington, D.C. Rules
expressly defines “law firm” to exclude government agencies,312 so
this addition reflects a decision to ensure that the rule includes
lawyer managers and supervisors at government agencies.313 The
Model Rules’ definition of “law firm” does not mention government

MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.1(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
The Washington, D.C. Rule states in relevant part:
(a) A partner in a law firm, and a lawyer who individually or together with
other lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm or
government agency, shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has
in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm
conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct.
(b) A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer shall
make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the
Rules of Professional Conduct.
(c) A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation of the Rules
of Professional Conduct if: (1) the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the
specific conduct, ratifies the conduct involved; or (2) the lawyer is a partner
or has comparable managerial authority in the law firm [or government
agency] in which the other lawyer practices, or has direct supervisory
authority over the other lawyer, and knows of the conduct at a time when its
consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable
remedial action.
D.C. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.1 (D.C. BAR 2022).
312 See id. r. 1.0(c) (“‘Firm’ or ‘law firm’ denotes a lawyer or lawyers in a law partnership,
professional corporation, sole proprietorship or other association authorized to practice law;
or lawyers employed in a legal services organization or the legal department of a corporation
or other organization but does not include a government agency or other government entity.”).
313 See id. r. 5.1(a) (including “government agencies” as entities where supervisors are
responsible for assuring subordinate lawyers comply with the professional rules of conduct);
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Pro. Resp., Formal Op. 14-467 (2014) (explaining what Rule 5.1
requires of managers and supervisors in a prosecutor’s office).
310
311
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entities, but a comment does314 and comment 1 to Rule 5.1 identifies
lawyers at government agencies as within the rule’s scope.315 Unlike
some of the other rules identified here, this rule does not offer a way
directly to resist improper interference. By complying with Rule 5.1
through seminars, lectures, and establishment of procedures
through which subordinate Department lawyers can seek guidance,
however, the Department reinforces the fact that compliance with
the professional conduct rules is an obligation superior to any
Executive Branch effort to improperly influence or direct the work
of the Department.
I. RULE 8.3(A)

Model Rule and Washington, D.C. Rule 8.3(a) both require that
a lawyer “who knows that another lawyer has committed a violation
of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial
question as to that lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as
a lawyer in other respects, shall inform the appropriate professional
authority.”316 In both documents, however, the first lawyer is
relieved of the duty to disclose “information otherwise protected by
Rule 1.6.”317 If there is a permissive or mandatory disclosure
exception to the confidentiality duty in Rule 1.6(a) or elsewhere,318
the “information” is not “protected” by the rule, which leaves the
mandatory duty of Rule 8.3(a) in place with no limitation.
It is sometimes inaccurately said that the legal profession is selfgoverning. In fact, the courts have final authority over the content
of a jurisdiction’s professional conduct rules.319 One way the

314 See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.0 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (“With respect to
the law department of an organization, including the government, there is ordinarily no
question that the members of the department constitute a firm within the meaning of the
Rules of Professional Conduct.”).
315 See id. r. 5.1 cmt. 1 (“[L]awyers having comparable managerial authority in a legal
services organization or a law department of an enterprise or government agency . . . .”).
316 Id. r. 8.3(a); D.C. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.3(a) (D.C. BAR 2022).
317 MODEL RULE OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.3(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020); D.C. RULES OF PRO.
CONDUCT r. 8.3(c) (D.C. BAR 2022).
318 For example, Model Rules 1.13, 3.3, and 4.1 all have permissive or mandatory exceptions
to Rule 1.6(a). So does the proposed Rule 1.13A. See supra text accompanying notes 255–285,
301–302.
319 See Carol A. Needham, Splitting Bar Admission into Federal and State Components:
National Admission for Advice on Federal Law, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 453, 463–64 (1997) (noting
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profession supposedly governs itself is by requiring disclosure of
serious rule violations by other lawyers.320 The threat that
transgressions will be reported to “the appropriate professional
authority”321 is meant to encourage compliance with the rules. That
authority includes the local disciplinary agency.322 An internal
Justice Department report should not be seen to satisfy the rule
because the Department cannot disbar, suspend, or publicly censure
its lawyers. Conduct warranting, for example, a license suspension
will escape that sanction if internal reporting is deemed adequate
to satisfy the requirements of the rule.
J. RULE 8.4(C) AND (D)

Both Model Rule and Washington, D.C. Rule 8.4(c) make it
“professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . [e]ngage in conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.”323 Model
Rule 8.4(d) forbids “conduct that is prejudicial to the administration
of justice.”324 The Washington, D.C. counterpart forbids “conduct
that seriously interferes with the administration of justice.”325
Fraud is a defined term in the Model Rules and the Washington,
D.C. Rules. Its meaning depends on substantive law.326 But the rule
does not restrict the meaning of “dishonesty,” “deceit,” and
“misrepresentation” to how they may be defined in criminal, tort, or
other law. Each word gives lawyers a basis to reject an instruction
on the ground that compliance would violate the rule in the lawyer’s
reasonable estimation. The lawyer, not the client or its constituents,
how the state's highest court usually has authority to set the professional rules of conduct for
its jurisdiction).
320 See Chuck Lundberg, Rule 8.3: Reporting Other Lawyers, 21 NO. 26 LAWYERS J. 8, 8
(2019) (“As a matter of professional responsibility, we attorneys are mandated reporters of
other lawyers, and we were mandated reporters long before statutory mandated reporting
became ‘a thing’ in the 1970s and 1980s . . . .”).
321 See supra note 316 and accompanying text.
322 See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.3 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (describing
alternatives to the bar disciplinary agency).
323 Id. r. 8.4(c) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020); D.C. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(c) (D.C. BAR 2022).
324 MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).
325 D.C. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.4(d) (D.C. BAR 2022).
326 The Model Rules and the Washington, D.C. Rules both provide: “‘Fraud’ or ‘fraudulent’
denotes conduct that is fraudulent under the substantive or procedural law of the applicable
jurisdiction and has a purpose to deceive.” MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.0(d) (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2020); D.C. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.0(d) (D.C. BAR 2022).
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has the authority and the duty to construe these words in the
context in which the instruction occurs.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This Article began with a hypothetical. It ends with a true story
with striking parallels:
In a call on Dec. 27, 2020, witnesses have said, Trump
told acting attorney general Jeffrey Rosen that he
wanted his Justice Department to say there was
significant election fraud, and said he was poised to oust
Rosen and replace him with Clark, who was willing to
make that assertion. Rosen told Trump that the Justice
Department could not “flip a switch and change the
election,” according to notes of the conversation cited by
the Senate Judiciary Committee. “I don’t expect you to
do that,” Trump responded, according to the notes. “Just
say the election was corrupt and leave the rest to me
and the Republican congressmen.” The President urged
Rosen to “just have a press conference.” Rosen refused.
“We don’t see that,” he told Trump. “We’re not going to
have a press conference.”327
Rosen’s “we” refers to lawyers in the Department of Justice.
Their refusal to do Trump’s bidding recognizes that their
professional responsibilities prevailed over executive power. Courts
have authority to write rules for the conduct of lawyers who are
admitted to their bar or practice in their jurisdiction. The premise
of this Article is that executive power is subordinate to those rules.
Whatever Chief Justice John Roberts meant when he wrote that the
President possesses “all of” the executive power,328 that power does
not displace the judiciary’s power to regulate the bar through rules
of professional conduct. There may be honest disagreement over
whether a particular professional conduct rule is within the judicial
power at all or as applied in the particular circumstance. Or over its
327 Carol D. Leonnig, Devlin Barrett, Josh Dawsey & Spencer S. Hsu, Justice Dept.
Investigating Trump’s Actions in Jan. 6 Criminal Probe, WASH. POST (July 26, 2022, 6:58
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/07/26/trump-justiceinvestigation-january-6.
328 See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text.
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meaning. The arbiter of that contest will, of course, be the judiciary
itself, which has the final say on “what the law is.”329 But once the
courts speak, the disagreement is resolved so far as lawyers are
concerned. That’s good for Justice Department lawyers as officers of
the court330 because it enables them to refuse an Executive Branch
instruction to act in a way that would violate professional conduct
rules or impinge on the professional autonomy that those rules give
them. They can say, as we might understand Jeffrey Rosen to have
said to Trump: “We won’t do that because we are lawyers first and
foremost.”

329 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and
duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is.”).
330 See Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 378 (1866) (“Attorneys and counsellors . . . are officers
of the court, admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of their possessing sufficient legal
learning and fair private character. . . . The order of admission is the judgment of the court
that the parties possess the requisite qualifications as attorneys and counsellors, and are
entitled to appear as such and conduct causes therein. From its entry the parties become
officers of the court, and are responsible to it for professional misconduct.”).
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